(01-22-2014 08:59 AM)Eva Elisabeth Wrote:  Laurie, IMO D. B. Mahin's "One war at a time" is a very good book, too (and has one chapter on cotton).

(01-17-2014 10:37 PM)Don1946 Wrote:  Seward was the mastermind behind Union diplomacy.

...Nevertheless I think Lincoln was not as unaware, ignorant, and uninvolved in foreign politics as many authors claim, but he had already more than enough business to do "at home". ...

I believe if Lincoln had had sufficient time, he would have tried to further educate himself on the subject as he did with military strategies and warfare.

What is your opinion - did Abraham Lincoln have an influence on or interest in foreign politics or not, and why (not)?

I think your perception of Lincoln's role is accurate and that his home-grown political savvy and his strong grasp of republican ideology and America's role as an inspiration to the world served him very well in understanding foreign affairs.

My take on Seward and Lincoln is that they were not rivals for long in 1861, that they developed a very close working and personal relationship. Each took the lead in developing complementary domestic and foreign policies. Seward was a politician who saw diplomacy as international politics. Some criticize him for that, but this is what led him to launch what I argue is the first sustained program in public diplomacy aimed at influencing public opinion rather than just government to government diplomacy. Lincoln let Seward direct foreign policy, but the two worked closely together and both were aware how domestic policies and events affected foreign affairs.

They were apart over emancipation, which was foreign policy as much as domestic and military strategy, I would argue. Lincoln insisted, and Seward resisted, the emancipation and arming of blacks in the South. Seward feared an emancipation edict would prompt European intervention and CSA independence. Lincoln thought it would bring the foreign public on the Union's side and make it impossible for any European nation to side with those fighting to preserve slavery.

One of Lincoln's most important and earliest informants on this matter was the German 48er Carl Shurz who in September 1861 pleaded with Seward and later met with Lincoln to implore that the Union make this a war against slavery. This would arouse the European public to side with the Union and thwart aristocratic Europe's plans to intervene on behalf of the South, Shurz thought. Lincoln and Schurz proved right, but it was not clear until later in 1863 when Europe really embraced the Emancipation Proclamation as a sincere turn in the Union's purpose in the war.

(01-22-2014 10:10 AM)Don1946 Wrote:  Seward feared an emancipation edict would prompt European intervention and CSA independence. Lincoln thought it would bring the foreign public on the Union's side and make it impossible for any European nation to side with those fighting to preserve slavery.

But Lincoln was absolutely right in this case, wasn't he? The issuing of the Emancipation Declaration indeed changed the Europeans' point of view on the war, Britain's first of all (but the French, German, and Italian as well), and they indeed sided with the Union as soon as they believed the war was about ending slavery. Before they hadn't really understood the reason for war at all, also due to lack of reliable information and insight.
...er, sorry, I should read more carefully, it's exactly what you say in you last passage. Nevertheless it's another point that IMO shows Lincoln's (sense for) foreign diplomacy wasn't as poor as often said.

As for Carl Schurz, during the 1860 campaign he predicted secession of the southern states and reminded of two prior "attempts": "one, the secession of the Southern students from the medical school in Philadelphia, the second, upon the election of Speaker [of the House] Pennington [in 1859], when the South seceeded from Congress, went out, took a drink, and then came back. The third attempt...would be when old Abe [was] elected. They would secede again and this time would take two drinks but come back again."

Thanks so far for all your comments!

Thank you all so much; I have learned more from these few postings about Lincoln and diplomacy than I ever learned in a classroom. Wouldn't it be interesting to speculate on how Mr. Lincoln would view (and deal with) the Middle East crises today?

One question: I thought Simon Cameron was "diplomatically" exiled to Russia where he couldn't do too much harm. Did I get that wrong?

(01-22-2014 11:36 AM)L Verge Wrote:  One question: I thought Simon Cameron was "diplomatically" exiled to Russia where he couldn't do too much harm. Did I get that wrong?

That's right. He only served in Russia for four months and was replaced with Cassius Clay (or was that Mohammad Ali?)
He was an important advisor to the Russian government, helping in their struggle implementing government corruption

Maybe since Cameron didn't stay long in Russia was the real reason we got such a sweet deal on Alaska. If Cameron had been involved with the transaction it would have been a "steal"

A very good summary on this is here:
http://www.mrlincolnandfriends.org/insid...ubjectID=7

Scroll down to "Artist Carpenter noted 'the friendly relations which existed between the President and Secretary Cameron were not interrupted by the retirement of the latter from the War Office.'" (or even further down).

The Russian government ended up supporting the Lincoln Administration during the Civil War and, at one point, made a show of force by sending some naval vessels to New York Harbor.

(01-22-2014 10:58 AM)Eva Elisabeth Wrote:  

(01-22-2014 10:10 AM)Don1946 Wrote:  Seward feared an emancipation edict would prompt European intervention and CSA independence. Lincoln thought it would bring the foreign public on the Union's side and make it impossible for any European nation to side with those fighting to preserve slavery.

But Lincoln was absolutely right in this case, wasn't he? The issuing of the Emancipation Declaration indeed changed the Europeans' point of view on the war, Britain's first of all (but the French, German, and Italian as well), and they indeed sided with the Union as soon as they believed the war was about ending slavery. Before they hadn't really understood the reason for war at all, also due to lack of reliable information and insight.

At first it appeared that Seward was right. The closest Britain ever came to intervention, to end the war on the basis of separation, was in September-October 1862. Rumors of the proclamation encouraged Earl Russell, the foreign minister, to go forward.
Gladstone made a speech days after news of the proclamation arrived announcing that the South had "made a nation" and it was time Britain recognized it.
What threw a monkey wrench into the British plans was the failure of France to join in, but also the refusal of Russia and other countries. France was distracted by Garibaldi's march on Rome. The French were protecting Rome and when Garibaldi was wounded and imprisoned it set off a wave of demonstrations across Europe and a shake up in Napoleon III's cabinet. From prison Garibaldi issued his "letter to the English nation" that called upon Britain to stand by its "daughter" America in its struggle against slavery.
It was not until the next year that the British public really came out strong for the Union, after the proclamation went into effect. Hundreds of meetings took place.
In France such political gatherings were banned but public sentiment began to turn in support of the Union.
In short, Seward was right at first, but Shurz was ultimately. Lincoln bet on the right idea and took the side of emancipation vs the cynical expectation that Europe would follow its material interests without heeding public opinion and the moral issue of slavery.

(01-22-2014 09:41 AM)Gene C Wrote:  I think so. He sent Simon Cameron over to be Minister to Russia. The Russians were so worried about what we might do to them next, that they offered Seward Alaska as a piece offering (plus Russia badly needed the money)

Gene, I highy recommend this article "U.S. Civil War: The US-Russian Alliance that Saved the Union" by Webster G. Tarpley. It can be found at http://www.voltairenet.org/article169488.html

It's a wonderful example of Lincoln's brilliance in understanding the vulnerabilities of key world players to his advantage.

To whet your interest: " ...The Russian-British rivalry was of course the central antagonism of European history after the Napoleonic era, and the Russian attitude towards London coincided with the traditional American resentment against the former colonial power."

"...Turning to the conflict of 1861-65, Thomas points out that “in the first two years of the war, when its outcome was still highly uncertain, the attitude of Russia was a potent factor in preventing Great Britain and France from adopting a policy of aggressive intervention.” (Thomas 129) He shows that the proposed British-French interference promoted by Lord Russell, the Foreign Secretary, in October 1862 was “deterred at this time mainly” by the Russian attitude, and cites Russell’s note to Palmerston concluding that Britain “ought not to move at present without Russia.” [5] (Thomas 132)

"...On September 22, 1862, Lincoln used the Confederate repulse at Antietam to issue a warning that slavery would be abolished in areas still engaged in rebellion against the United States on January 1, 1863. The Russian Tsar Alexander II had liberated the 23 million serfs of the Russian Empire in 1861, so this underlined the nature of the US-Russian convergence as a force for human freedom. This imminent Emancipation Proclamation was also an important political factor in slowing Anglo-French meddling, but it would not have been decisive by itself. The British cabinet, as Seward had predicted, regarded emancipation as an act of desperation. The London Times accused Lincoln in lurid and racist terms of wanting to provoke a slave rebellion and a race war."

Roger and Anita, I've scanned (as I'm too lazy to type it all) what Mahin writes on Russian-American relations (and the footnotes):
        .    

(01-22-2014 10:11 PM)Eva Elisabeth Wrote:  Roger and Anita, I've scanned (as I'm too lazy to type it all) what Mahin writes on Russian-American relations (and the footnotes):
.

Thanks Eva, "One War At a Time" is now on my reading list.

In regards to the Russian relations, many long years ago I read about an incident that occurred while the Russian Navy was wintering in New York harbor. A bar fight broke out with some Americans and the Russian sailors, and one of the sailors was killed. I ca't remember the details, but for some reason the body was not returned to the Russians and there was a diplomatic incident where Lincoln was asked to intervene. Has anyone else ever read about this?

First I've ever heard of it

(01-14-2014 09:18 PM)JMadonna Wrote:  

(01-14-2014 09:00 PM)Eva Elisabeth Wrote:  In that book ("One War at a time") D. Mahin writes: " A last desperate effort to obtain European recognition in return for a vague promise to free the slaves was made (by the Confederate government) in early 1865."

Unfortunatelly he gives no sources for this statement. Does anyone know any details (which persons were involved/addressed; what exactly was proposed) or original sources?

Judah Benjamin was the man. He was desperately trying to convince Davis that slaves were needed to fill Lee's defense lines around Richmond. By giving them freedom for their services they would also address the biggest objection Europe had against supporting them.

Davis made the proposal to Congress who were aghast at the proposition. It was too little too late.

Benjamin and Davis sent Duncan Kenner over to Europe in December 1864 to offer eventual emancipation in exchange for recognition. Kenner did not arrive until late February and he let Slidell and Mason issue the offer to Napoleon III and Lord Palmerston. Mason could not bring himself to utter the words and he worried that he had blown the Confederacy's last chance for winning foreign recognition.

(01-22-2014 09:27 PM)Anita Wrote:  Gene, I highy recommend this article "U.S. Civil War: The US-Russian Alliance that Saved the Union" by Webster G. Tarpley. It can be found at http://www.voltairenet.org/article169488.html

It's a wonderful example of Lincoln's brilliance in understanding the vulnerabilities of key world players to his advantage.

I was concerned after exploring Webster G. Tarpley's other writings on Amazon that this might be a little, shall I say, on the fringe, but he seems to have done a good job of digesting some of the older scholarship on the diplomacy of the Civil War.
Lincoln was not really involved in foreign policy and claims about his genius for it ought to be tempered by recognition of Seward's leading role in these matters. The two men worked well together. Theirs was a team of collaboration not rivalry, pace Doris Kearns Goodwin.
The Russian affair, the visiting of the fleet to NYC and San Francisco, is a fascinating story, and Russia's reluctance to join with Britain and France was important, but it exaggerates matters to say that Russia thwarted the 1862 plan for intervention. The British public recoiled from Gladstone's bombastic speech, Oct. 1862, foreshadowing British intervention. France went through a government crisis at the same time, thanks to Giuseppe Garibaldi and his march on Rome. Later, the impact of the Emancipation Proclamation and the public embrace of that by early 1863 helped the US. The Polish uprising in January 1863, crushed by the Russians by the way, distracted Europe that winter and spring. The threat of intervention would resurface, but never with so much peril as in the autumn of 1862.

Don, I'm really enjoying reading your posts. It looks like your book will make fascinating reading!

I just hope that no one here loses sight of the fact that, whatever Lincoln's hopes were for the Emancipation Proclamation affecting possible European intervention, he also had the domestic front to consider, too, including the Union's overall poor showing militarily thus far, and the very basic reason for issuing the Proclamation - that it struck the first real blow against slavery in a Constitutional way.

Also, shouldn't Lincoln get credit for valuing Seward's services? He clearly made a point of keeping the most talented people in his Administration. If he had had serious concerns about the overall tenor of Seward's diplomatic strategy, I'm sure he would have tried to steer things on a different course, and/or persuaded Seward to do so. We know Lincoln was not a micro-manager, except where his generals failed him. Even FDR, a truly activist president but himself not a micro-manager, knew how to get the most and best out of his cabinet members and other high-level Administration officials. I would say that that that's just as important as the Chief Executive taking the reins himself.