Perhaps this thread could look at how Lincoln handled his duties as Commander in Chief- his successful moves as well as his blunders. I got the idea for this thread while reading the book Father Abraham: Lincoln's Relentless Struggle to End Slavery by Richard Striner. On pages 184 and 185, Striner mentions that Lincoln did not like the plan that was in place for General Burnside to attack Lee via the Rappahannock River. The situation on the ground had changed since Lincoln had initially given the "okay" for the attack plan. However, both Burnside and Halleck rejected Lincoln's new plan. Thus, the Battle of Fredericksburg took place-and as we all know-was a Union disaster. Now in this particular instance, Lincoln's keen sense for things (without any formal military education) told him that something had to change to meet what had changed with the situation. Potentially, had his generals listened to him, maybe the battle would have had totally different results. Yet, at the same time, maybe Lincoln as Commander in Chief should have ordered the changes in the plan. What do you all think? What other examples can you think of that demonstrate-good or bad-Lincoln's handling of the Commander in Chief role?

I think Lincoln was in an impossible situation regarding Fredericksburg as it would have required having a relatively inexperienced President overturning opinions of 2 different generals.

Lincoln's principal Civil War blunders involved appointments. His agreement before the War to make the corrupt and incompetent Simon Cameron Secretary of War was the worst. His penchant in the early years to cement the Republican Party by making politicians generals-Butler,Banks and Sigel come to mind-was almost as bad. It is fortunate and interesting that while many a politician thought he had the aptitude for military field command,no civilian claimed sufficient knowledge to exercise equivalent authority in the US Navy.
Tom

One has to be amazed at the thought of Lincoln-Commander in Chief-checking out books on military tactics from the Library of Congress to "study up" on the subject-during the nations greatest hour of peril.

A general is like a surgeon who is unable to perform his profession in peacetime and when he operates on his first patient discovers the internal organs are differently constituted than he believed and may be in different locations. In the Civil War the best generals were those who were not slaves of outmoded Napoleonic doctrine and could adapt tried and true techniques to the new environment of the deadly rifled musket.

For the Union it was sad that Winfield Scott was too old to function as General in Chief. Certainly Scott erred in asserting that the brigade was the highest official formation a General could effectively command. No doubt he was correct that precious few Union officers could do so in 1861.

Scott was the designer of the "Anaconda Plan";a much more offensive variant of which became the Union grand strategy. His expedition to Mexico City in 1847 produced a tribute from the Duke of Wellington who deemed him the greatest soldier of the age.

Scott resigned his post due to the infirmities of age in late 1861 and retired to West Point where Pres Lincoln more than once traveled to solicit his advice. Too bad we do not have transcripts or recordings of their conversations.
Tom

Tom: well stated! Scott is certainly one of our nation's greatest soldiers. How ironic and sad that he is unknown to the public at large today. Those talks between the two would have been fascinating, indeed. Basically, his conception of what would win the war was correct. Lincoln and Grant carried it out.

Lincoln's main contribution early in the war was to get his generals moving against the enemy. He red all tghose books on strategy and tactics to understand how armies moved and fought, but outside a lot of bad moves against Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah in 1862, Lincoln brought Henry Halleck in from the West to be his general in chief. Halleck however was too much of a bureaucrat and theorist to be an imaginative general and lost his footing during the Second Manassas Campaign. But Lincoln kept Halleck on as a sort of Chief of Staff--he knew the language of both politicians and generals and could translate orders to the generals and tell Lincoln what they were doing. From there on out, Lincoln searched for a true commanding general, and his policy of replacement of army commanders who failed to perform is well-known. To get a notion of how gut-wrenching a process this could be read Bruce Catton's Mr Lincoln's army, the thesis that the Army of the Potomac, McClellan's bodyguard, as Lincoln called it, became the President's army. Also still good is T Harry Williams, Mr Lincoln's Generals. Most of the real candidates to top command came out of the West, where they were far enough from Washington to be somewhat isolated from DC politics. In the end, the Grant-Sherman-Thomas team took over in late 1863. Grant moved East to be general in Chief. He had what Lincoln wanted--drive. Sherman and Thomas commanded in the West (Thomas winning the only decisive large battle Of the Civil War at Nashville) while Meade of Gettysburg fame continued to command the Army of the Potomac to the end, although Grant rode along with him to prod Meade and get away from DC politics--Grant was not hesitant to have telegraph "problems" to keep the politicians away. Lincoln so trusted Grant that he no longer had to function actively as C in C as before.

Had Gen. Scott not trained any of his regular line officers to follow in his footsteps?

Laurie, I think Lee was looked upon as being next in line to take over after Scott.

(03-04-2013, 10:43 AM)L Verge Wrote: Had Gen. Scott not trained any of his regular line officers to follow in his footsteps?

During the secession crisis, through the time of Lincoln's first inauguration, and in the period immediately after the firing on Fort Sumter, military personnel, including many of the most talented officers, bled the U.S. Army almost dry when they left their U.S. posts to lead the rebels. Lee, of course, was one of them.

It happened that most of the military talent was of Southern origin. This was due to a difference in culture between North and South. One of the few paths upward in the South, apart from being a planter, was the path of military service. The South was a much more militarized society in general than was the North. In the North, there were many more economic opportunities. There was much more economic development, and greater use and construction of railroads. Most American manufacturing resided in the North. Most immigrants settled in the North because that's where the economic opportunities were.

An interesting book to read on the subject of the military nature of Southern society is The Militant South: 1800-1861 by John Hope Franklin. Another very good one, which addresses the suppression of free speech in the South, and which certainly was not helpful in the struggle against slavery and probably helped fan the flames of the South's militarization, is The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South by Clement Eaton.

Good point, Liz. One of the interesting Yankee responses to Southern Militarism was to think about closing West Point during the war. A couple of interesting articles are: T Harry Williams, “The Attack upon West Point during the Civil War,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 25 (Mar. 1939), 491-504; Lori A. Lisowski, "The Future of West Point: Senate Debates on the Military Academy during the Civil War," Civil War History, 34 (March 1998), 5-21.

Being a Virginian himself, Scott believed Virginians in particular and Southerners in general had a greater aptitude for command. Many civil war accounts talk of ambititious pre-war Northern officers resigning out of discouragement over career prospects based on a perception of bias by Scott but I wonder if this is true.

As to Laurie Verge asking why Scott did not train his officers for high command,only the Prussian Army with its prerequisite of graduation from the Prussian War Academy-which was the world's first staff college-before an officer was posted to the great general staff,the brains of the Prussian Army, had formal military continuing education for high command and staff work. .

After Prussia created the German Empire after its brilliant military successes against serially Denmark,Austria and France from 1864-1871 every nation created the modern staff college and the general staff system. .

Imitation is the surest sign of flattery.
Tom

Thanks, Tom. That was the answer I was looking for. I taught Southern militarism for so many years that I knew the South began the war with superior officers' training. My 8th graders always thought the South should have won the war - until I had them list what else that region had going for it as opposed to the North. P.S. I taught right outside the gates of Andrews Air Force Base (now Joint Base Andrews), so military might was a big issue with those kids. I had General Westmoreland's niece as a student one year. And, yes, this was during the Viet Nam War.

The various posts on this thread are so informative. We really have a great team of experts on this Forum.

(03-03-2013, 09:43 PM)LincolnMan Wrote: One has to be amazed at the thought of Lincoln-Commander in Chief-checking out books on military tactics from the Library of Congress to "study up" on the subject-during the nations greatest hour of peril.

Lincoln was humble enough to admit what he didn't know. What I find amazing is that successors like Wilson and FDR didn't follow the example. FDR in particular wasted hundreds[/i] of thousands of lives insisting on unconditional surrender.

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(03-04-2013, 02:11 AM)Thomas Thorne Wrote: Scott was the designer of the "Anaconda Plan";a much more offensive variant of which became the Union grand strategy. His expedition to Mexico City in 1847 produced a tribute from the Duke of Wellington who deemed him the greatest soldier of the age.

Scott resigned his post due to the infirmities of age in late 1861 and retired to West Point where Pres Lincoln more than once traveled to solicit his advice. Too bad we do not have transcripts or recordings of their conversations.
Tom

No doubt that had Scott not stayed loyal we'd have had a different history.
He's the only one who never believed it would be a short war. His "Anaconda Plan" became the Union's grand strategy only after the "on to Richmond" plan failed.

And from what I know, Lincoln was not a supporter of the "on to Richmond" strategy. He was for the "get the Southern army" plan. It was Grant who actually understood Lincoln's thinking on it to the fullest.