Lincoln as Commander in Chief

[JMadonna]

(03-04-2013 08:34 PM)LincolnMan Wrote:  And from what I know, Lincoln was not a supporter of the "on to Richmond" strategy. He was for the "get the Southern army" plan. It was Grant who actually understood Lincoln's thinking on it to the fullest.

The 'on to Richmond' plan was actually Horace Greeley's plan. A newsman's opinion actually became military doctrine.

[LincolnMan]

That's amazing in itself-the power of the media-still a huge factor in molding things today.

[Mike B.]

I kind of think there is a book waiting to look at Lincoln's tactical decisions at Commander-in-Chief because he made some bad ones.

I think "On to Richmond" was actually a proper strategy. If the Army of Northern Viriginia could have been cooped up in Richmond in a siege it would have had to surrender in mass.

The great victories of the Civil War where when Confederate armies were forced to defend a specific piece of land and were trapped. (i.e. Fort Donnelson, Vicksburg, etc.)

The armies were just too evenly matched to destroy each other in the open field.

[LincolnMan]

Good point Mike. Grant did just that at the end. The problem was that Lee's army was always on the move prior to that!

[JMadonna]

(03-16-2013 09:28 AM)Mike B. Wrote:  I think "On to Richmond" was actually a proper strategy. If the Army of Northern Viriginia could have been cooped up in Richmond in a siege it would have had to surrender in mass.

The surrender of Richmond early in the war would not have ended the war, neither would a surrender of Washington.

Besides if you cooped up the Army of Northern Virginia they still would have been supplied via Georgia.

The art of war says you don't hit your opponent where he's strongest you hit him where he's weak and force him out of his strong position. It took the Feds a good year to learn frontal assaults were suicide.

[Mike B.]

(03-16-2013 08:37 PM)JMadonna Wrote:  

(03-16-2013 09:28 AM)Mike B. Wrote:  I think "On to Richmond" was actually a proper strategy. If the Army of Northern Viriginia could have been cooped up in Richmond in a siege it would have had to surrender in mass.

The surrender of Richmond early in the war would not have ended the war, neither would a surrender of Washington.

Besides if you cooped up the Army of Northern Virginia they still would have been supplied via Georgia.

The art of war says you don't hit your opponent where he's strongest you hit him where he's weak and force him out of his strong position. It took the Feds a good year to learn frontal assaults were suicide.

I am not so sure.

Robert E. Lee told Jubal Early in May 1864, "We must stop this army of Grant's before it gets to the James. Once it gets there it will become a siege and then it is a mere matter of time."

Little Mac changed his base and was on the James after the Seven Days Battle in 1862. He wanted to slip into Petersburg which would have put Lee's Army in a very bad position because the Weldon and Southside R.R.'s would have been moot to supply him.

Little Mac had perhaps better strategic sense than Lincoln, it was carrying it out fast enough.

The truth is that Jefferson Davis and the people of the South never realized what Washington realized. The real streagth of the CSA was not its cities and its land. It was its armies. As long as they could maintain armies in the field, they were unbeatable. But trying to hold onto every inch of land was a big mistake and forced disasters like Vicksburg, New Orleans, Fort Donelson.

[Thomas Thorne]

I am unaware of any writer who ever suggested that Lincoln,Halleck or any other Civil War figure was aware of Clausewitz but Lincoln's emphasis on the destruction of the Confederate Army would have met with Clausewitz's approval.

The "On to Richmond" propaganda of 1861 was motivated by the short war fallacy and the fixation that it was imperative to drive the Rebels from their capital before the Confederate Congress assembled there. Twice in our history British armies captured the US capital-Philadelphia in 1777 and Washington in 1814 without significant strategic effect.

Richmond in the Civil War was much more important as it was the industrial center of the Confederacy and was crucial to the functioning of the Confederate armies in a way the political city of Washington could never be for the Union. Any Federal attempt to capture Richmond would be met by fierce Confederate resistance which would permit Lincoln to achieve multiple objectives.

In Apr 65 Lee faced a truly dreadful choice. He could either permit himself to be trapped within Richmond with his army thereby both losing the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond's ability to succor the Confederate armies or abandon Richmond and its resources in what was clearly a "Hail Mary" play to escape to North Carolina to combine with Joe Johnston to defeat Sherman.
Tom

[Laurie Verge]

I never heard of Clausewitz. Someone please fill me in.

[Bill Richter]

On to Richmond was a political strategy, designed to appeal to the public. The generals all thought it was no good. But the problem was that commanding generals are often saddled with political realities. What Lincoln liked about Grant was Grant's willingness and ability to recognize political realities, like working with Ben Butler, Franz Sigel, David Hunter, John McClernand, and others, who were poor leaders militarily.

Each of these men had political qualities that were important to Lincoln and the Republican Party when it came to votes. Butler had commanded the largest number of troops in US history at a Massachusetts militia camp in the late 1850, he also had to votes of nominal Democratic millhands. Sigel was a great favorite with the German voters in several mid-west states. Hunter had Radical Republican support. McClernand raised scores of Union regiments from Democratic areas of southern Illinois. Unlike the other generals Grant did his best to used these men getting rid of them as they proved unable to fight the war properly. It was something Scott and McClellan never understood.

This is what made Grant a great general--he understood the need to help the politicians with their problems, and Lincoln helped him with his and gave him cover with the public as he lost nearly 100,000 men in the 1864 Overland Campaign against Richmond and brought Robt E Lee to bay at Petersburg in a siege that Lee could not win. After the Election of 1864, with Lincoln safely reelected, Lincoln reciprocated and allowed Grant to clean his military house at will. Grant was a much better politician than he gets credit for being.

[JMadonna]

(03-19-2013 08:29 AM)Laurie Verge Wrote:  I never heard of Clausewitz. Someone please fill me in.

Clausewitz was a German-Prussian soldier and military theorist who fought against Napoleon. He believed that "War is the continuation of Politics by other means" and was the first European to write about the psychological and political aspects of war. His rival in the military theorist realm was the Frenchman Jomini who studied under Napoleon and believed that war could be broken down to tactics and mapwork.
At the time of the Civil War, West Point taught the theories of Jomini because Winfield Scott was a great believer in his methods. Clausewitz classic work was called 'On War' which is still studied today.

[L Verge]

Thank you, Jerry. Sounds like I would stand with Clausewitz. I'd analyze the enemy to death. That's what I do with y'all. I build up psychological profiles about what makes you tick. That should worry all of you.

[Jim Page]

(03-19-2013 05:35 PM)L Verge Wrote:  I build up psychological profiles about what makes you tick. That should worry all of you.

Boy howdy. Where are the Watergate burglars when you really need them?!??!?

--Jim

[Gene C]

Fido and I aren't worried.
We used to be crazy......but we're a whole lot better now!

http://www.myspace.com/raystevensmusic/m...razy-39251

[RJNorton]

If true, Laurie, I am leaving and headed this way.

[Hess1865]

and Lee didn't have the nerve to meet Grant on an open field of battle....