Lincoln's Gamble: The Tumultuous Six Months that Gave America the Emancipation

[Eva Elisabeth]

Tom, I hope you saw I was arguing why I don't give much on this quote!

[Eva Elisabeth]

(09-05-2014 07:25 PM)L Verge Wrote:  IMO, at some point shortly before signing the Proclamation, Mr. Lincoln had to have doubts about what he was doing. Signing that edict changed the purpose of the war for both Union folks (who had signed on to save the country, not free the slaves) and Confederates (who now realized that it was full scale war against their way of life).
Surely Mr. Lincoln had to question his own actions at some point before he "bit the bullet" and dipped his pen in ink.

I sure agree he thought a lot back and forth, I just believe it had happened earlier and, like Roger, I think he was firm and decisive once the decision was made, for the main reason that this character trait was so often attributed to him. There were quite some others who doubted he would sign though, like the Radical Republicans.

The timeline of the procedure reads as follows:
July 13, 1862: Lincoln read initial draft of the Emancipation Proclamation to Secretaries Seward and Welles.
July 22: Lincoln discussed Draft of the Emancipation Proclamation at a cabinet meeting.
September: Antietam campaign.
Sept. 22: Cabinet discussion of Emancipation.
First printing of preliminary version of Emancipation Proclamation.
Jan. 1, 1863: Lincoln signed the Final Draft of the Emancipation Proclamation.

As for arriving at his decision, Lincoln told Francis B. Carpenter: "Finally, came the week of the battle of Antietam. I determined to wait no longer. The news came, I think, on Wednesday, that the advantage as on our side. I was then staying at the Soldiers' Home. Here I finished writing the second draft of the preliminary proclamation; came up on Saturday; called the Cabinet together to hear it, and it was published the following Monday."

Actually I believe he was firm by the time of the decisive Cabinet meeting on Sept. 22. As Chase wrote in his diary, Lincoln presented his plans as follows:
"Gentlemen: I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to Slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an Order I had prepared on this subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then, my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought all along that the time for action on it might very probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it were a better time...I do not wish your advice about the main matter – for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending any thing but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. ... , there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take." Chase commented: "The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts...showing that he had fully considered the whole subject, in all lights under which it had been presented to him."
(D. Donald: "Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase", p. 149-152.)

Gideon Welles and Treasury official Maunsell B. Field recalled the scene in a similar way.

Colfax' entire quote supports this:
"...he said to me and other friends that night: 'The signature looks a little tremulous, for my hand was tired, but my resolution was firm. I told them in September if they did not return to their allegiance, and cease murdering our soldiers, I would strike at the pillar of their strenght. And now the promise shall be kept,and not one word of it will I ever recall."

As for Roger's quote:

(09-06-2014 09:09 AM)RJNorton Wrote:  I came upon this Lincoln quote in the Fehrenbachers' book. The authors give it a "C." It does not seem to support my personal opinion that Lincoln was firm and decisive, but I thought, in all fairness, I should post it. The quote's source is Reverend John McClintock. McClintock included the quote in a sermon preached on April 16, 1865. The conversation he had with Lincoln probably occurred in 1864.
"Ah, Providence is stronger than either you or I. When I issued that proclamation, I was in great doubt about it myself. I did not think that the people had been quite educated up to it, and I feared its effects upon the border states. Yet I think it was right. I knew it would help our cause in Europe, and I trusted in God and did it."

...I'd love to know why the Fehrenbachers' rated it "C". However, even if he still had doubts (or better was insecure as for what effects to estimate) I so far doubt anything could seriously have made him retreat from signing - and he DID sign.

[RJNorton]

(09-06-2014 06:18 PM)Eva Elisabeth Wrote:  ...I'd love to know why the Fehrenbachers' rated it "C".

Hi Eva. I will guess that it was rated a "C" because it was reported noncontemporaneously. The conversation between Lincoln and McClintock was in 1864, but McClintock didn't relate Lincoln's words until April 16, 1865. If he had related Lincoln's words right away in 1864 my guess would be that the Fehrenbachers would have rated it higher.

[Eva Elisabeth]

Thanks, Roger!
Re: "I knew it would help our cause in Europe" - stating this as the reason, especially towards a reverent, seems odd to me. Of all possible motives (political ones and aspects of humanity), Europe, I would think, was the least on Lincoln's mind. Towards a reverent I would have expected he had pointed out something "anti-slavery" - though to "strike at the pillar of their strenght", and such as the political pressure after General Hunter's order freeing the slaves of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida in May actually might have ranked higher. But I doubt Europe had much influence on his thinking after the Trent Affair being settled in January 1862.

[Thomas Thorne]

I am not as confident as Eva Elisabeth that there was no need to worry about Anglo-Franco intervention in the American Civil War after resolution of the Trent affair.

On the same day as the battle of Antietam-9/17/1862-Lord Russell, the Foreign Secretary, proposed to Prime Minister Palmerston "that if the North refused to negotiate{on the basis of separation}we ought ourselves to recognise the Southern States as an independent state." According to Gary W Gallagher's "The Confederate War ", parts of which are available in Google Books, the Palmerston cabinet was moving toward adoption of this policy which depended upon Confederate military success.

Recognition of the Confederacy would have provoked a United States declaration of war on the offending state.

What is so puzzling about this is ,contrary to a venerable historical tradition, how little support the CSA enjoyed among members of the British parliament. See Amanda Foreman's "A World on Fire."
Tom

[Eva Elisabeth]

I'd love to learn what Bill Richter thinks and knows about this - whether after the Trent Affair there was at any time a serious danger of British/French interference in favour of the Confedrates, or not?

[Wild Bill]

I agree with Thomas on this one

[L Verge]

Weren't the British still building ships for the Confederacy well past 1862? They must have been running the blockade also because it was the fall of 1864 when Rose O'Neal Greenhow tried to escape from a British ship that she was on -- in possession of dispatches and $2000 in gold that I would assume were coming from Europe.

[Eva Elisabeth]

(09-08-2014 12:30 PM)Wild Bill Wrote:  I agree with Thomas on this one

Thanks, Bill! You both are the experts.

[Wild Bill]

The key is in Sept 1863, when the British refused to allow the Laird Rams to leave Birkenhead shipyards. The settlement of the Alabama Claims in 1871 in the US favor proves the point, as does the settlement of the San Juan Islands dispute in Puget Sound (Seattle), as referred by Kaiser Wilhelm I. An angry USA was not in British interest in the future

[Thomas Thorne]

I remember reading an account of the climax of the Laird Rams Crisis. The frantic American minister to Britain,Charles Francis Adams. laid siege to important British personalities and implored them to confiscate the vessels Fearful they would not,he was preparing in his mind what he would say in his written demand for his passports. This is diplomatese for severing diplomatic relations between states.

I believe British officials felt the same way toward the United States but happily without the intense hatred that Georges Clemenceau,the "tiger of France" felt toward Germany when he said he "loved Germany so much he wanted two of them."

A British desire for the breakup of the United States,unfortunately for the Confederacy, did not translate into British willingness to fight the United States unless as in the Trent Affair British vital interests were affected or the US became so weak she could not harm the UK. .

By coincidence today, reading this month's account of the origins of World War I by Margaret MacMillan-'The War That Ended Peace" I unearthed the feelings of the three time British Prime Minister, Robert Cecil, Marquess of Salisbury 1830-1903, an aristocrat's aristocrat, who had a life long loathing of the United States.

Salisbury "found in Americans everything he detested about the modern world:they were greedy,materialistic,hypocritical,and vulgar and believed that democracy was the best form of government. During the Civil War he was a passionate supporter of the Confederate side,partly because he believed that Southerners were gentlemen and Northerners were not."

The author quoted a letter Salisbury wrote in 1902, fearing the growth of American power "It is very sad, but I am afraid America is bound to forge ahead and nothing can restore the equality between us. If we had interfered in the Confederate War, it was then possible for us to reduce the power of the United States to manageable proportions. But two such chances are not given to a nation in the course of its career."

It is fortunate that Lord Salisbury confined his hatred of the US to private letters. His last premiership had many famous episodes of British retreat in the face of American demands, including acceptance of American expansion and renunciation of British interest in what become the Panama Canal.

PS Now our civil war has had many names but "Confederate War" is new to me.
Tom

[Eva Elisabeth]

As I had understood, the rams ("commercial vessels" to be armed in France) were build for profit by Lairds & Birkenhead rather than real interest in supporting the Confederacy to win the war.

When exactly did the British government know of all this, from the beginning? Or did they take the "commercial vessels" at first? Were the rams indeed comparable to the US ironclads?

However, again, the CSA were not openly recognized, Bulloch entered the contract as a private citizen with no reference to the Confederacy.

[Thomas Thorne]

Both the British and U.S governments were aware of the existence of the Laird rams as early as June 1862. At first they were believed to be Alabama type commerce destroyers but soon their true nature as ships capable of sinking Union warships maintaining the blockade of Southern ports was known.

British efforts to prevent men of war being fitted out in British shipyards were hampered by the provisions of their Foreign Enlistment Act of 1861 which was interpreted in such a way as to require any ship built in British ports had to actually be completed ,leave port, be modified to add on warship characteristics and crew ,and act as a man of war before its builders could be found in violation of the law.

American efforts to forestall the menace of the Laird Rams included an Act of Congress granting the President authority to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal. American statements that these actions were intended only against Confederate warships fooled no one in England who realized they were hunting licenses against the British merchant marine in a third Anglo-American war.
Tom

[Eva Elisabeth]

Thanks, Tom!

[Thomas Thorne]

The law was rather a mess.

James Bulloch, the Confederate naval agent and uncle of future president Theodore Roosevelt,brainstormed with British lawyers and came up with the idea that if a ship armed and outfitted outside the UK, the builders were absolved of all responsibility. The British law officers did not entirely buy this theory by their repeated questioning of the builders but Lairds was smart enough to plead ignorance of the intentions and even identity of their real clients and left few traces for investigators to chew on.
Tom