Frederick Demond

[Dave Taylor]

Lately, there has been some conversation about a man by the name of Frederick A. Demond and his accounts regarding what occurred at the Maryland side of the Navy Yard Bridge when John Wilkes Booth and David Herold crossed. I questioned the reliability of this man and his recollections from decades later. I also criticized Demond’s well established association with Finis Bates, perpetrator of the “John Wilkes Booth Mummy” story. These issues threw up red flags to me and I, admittedly, got frustrated with those who were continually giving Mr. Demond’s words far more weight than I believed him worthy. I voiced these criticisms, attempting to display the fallacy of relying on dated and questionable references merely because they support ones’ favored view on a subject.

At the risk of being perceived as attacking anyone or of having an agenda other than the quest for truth, I am now going to post Demond’s different accounts over the years so that everyone may draw their own conclusion on his reliability and trustworthiness.

April 21, 1865 (7 days after the event)
In a letter written to his brother, George, Frederick had the following to say about the bridge crossing:

Quote:“The night that the President was shot, I was on guard about 11 o'clock. They came over the bridge two men on horses and they told us the President was shot.

The next day we found out that the very same men that told us that he was shot was the very same man that shot hime. If we had known it a half hour sooner we would have got the reward, which is 40,000 dollars. It was too bad that we had not have known it sooner. If we have we could have stopped them.

I saw Booth myself when he crossed the bridge and if I ever see him again, you better believe that I will stop him."

The rest of the letter (which does not deal with the bridge crossing) can be read here.

December 13, 1897 (32.5 years after the event)
Demond wrote a letter to David Dana, after reading an account from Dana that had published in the Boston Globe. You can read Dana’s full newspaper article here. This is Demond’s reply that Dana also had published in the Boston Globe:

Quote:“Mr D. D. Dana:
Dear Sir and Comrade – I was very much interested in reading your account of how you tried to prevent the assassination of the late Pres Lincoln, as published in The Globe of yesterday. It brought back old memories to me of away back in 64, as I was a member of your old provost guard, with headquarters at Fort Baker.

Well do I remember those days. I was detailed from my company—Co. C, Capt. A. W. Brigham, then stationed at fort Mahan—and ordered to report to you at fort Baker for duty on provost guard. I did so, and was employed guarding prisoners, sawing wood and going down to Uniontown searching for soldiers without passes. After a short time of service at headquarters I, with some others from your command, was sent to guard the bridge leading from Washington to Uniontown, down by the navy yard.

I was stationed at the Uniontown end of the bridge where the gates were hung to stop people from going to Washington. I was under the orders of Corp. Sullivan—I think that was his name—and the command at the other end of the bridge, the Washington side, was under Sergt. Cobb.

I was present the night that Booth and Harold crossed, after Booth had shot the President, but was not on post. I stood in the door of the blockhouse when Booth rode up, and heard him ask the guard if anyone had gone through lately. I heard the guard on the post answer him 'No,' and ask him what he was doing out there this time of night?

He made some kind of answer about going to see some one who lived out on the T. B. road. I did not pay much attention at this time to what they were talking about. I helped open the gate and he rode through.

A short time after this Harold rode over the bridge and asked if there had been anyone through, mounted on a bay horse. Upon being told that there had, he muttered something about being ‘a pretty man not to wait for him.’

Well, we opened the gate and let him through, and he rode off in a hurry. About 20 minutes later, I should say, we heard a great uproar across the bridge, and in a short time got word of the assassination. If we had only known it sooner neither one of them would have passed us, as I would have shot them as quickly as I would a mad dog. But it was too late; they were out of sight and hearing by that time.

I remember when you came down to meet someone that was waiting on the Washington side, but never knew who it was until I read the account given by you in The Sunday Globe. I remember of your going in pursuit, and, if I am not mistaken, one of Co. C.'s boys, Charles Joise, was with you.

Excuse my writing to you, but I was so glad to hear from you, lieutenant, that I had to let you know that one of your old boys was still living. Hoping sometime to see you on a visit to me up here, I remain, yours with great respect,

F. A. Demond, Cavendish, Vt.
Late private Co. C, 3rd Heavy Artillery, Massachusetts Volunteers."

September 16, 1911 (46 years after the event)
Demond replied to a letter from Finis Bates, author of the volume The Escape and Suicide of John Wilkes Booth. This is the first of three existing correspondences between the men.

Quote:“Cavendish VT Sept 16th 1911
Mr F. L. Bates

Dear Sir
your letter of 11th at hand also the Book. I was very much interested in the reading of same and also very much surprised to read Genl Dana’s story for there was some Parts of that story that was not as I knew it at the time. and I can say that he is mistaken in some Parts of his Story. I will try to let you know what I do know about the Proceedings of that memoral night. First the Guard on Bridge was not taken off untill if I can remember two days after the 14th I think it was the 16th of the month. he also states that the Guards were taken to Head quarters a Fort Baker. he is again wrong, for we were sent to our companys. mine C. co, were then at Fort Mahan. I am Positive in this for the next day about noon on 15th of April, there was a great deal of excitement at Union Town. This town was across from Washington the Bridge running between the two Places. I was one of the Guards at the Block House on the union Town side and some of the men of said town were feeling quite happy account of the Death of the President. one of said men said in my own presence that he was Dam Glad of it. the next minute he was laying on the Ground with a very sore Head for I had hit him with the Butt of my Gun. and I was on the Point of running him through with my Bayonet, but was stopped by the Corporal of the Guard. you bet I was mad. This incident does away with Gen. Dana’s report of taken off the Guard that night. I have enclosed in this letter a letter from a comrade of my regiment that also discredit Gen Dana story for upon reading same you will soon see that the Soldiers were not Ordered out until after the assanation, instead of before as stated by Dana. also I know myself that the troops were not Ordered out untill that night for I heard the long roll sounding from Fort to Fort. well about this part of the story of Dana’s I have written all that I can remember so I will try to let you know about some other things that you would like to know. the man that met Gen Dana that night was Orderly with orders to him to turn out the Soldiers and surround Washington and not to let any one out or in without Passes. why I think so is that we then received just such orders from Dana himself. the man that went with Dana was Chas Jose of my Co. who is now Dead. The Guards name who was on Post and called me to help him open the gate was Drake he was a member of the same Co. as I belonged to. I do not remember his first name. he was on Guard from 9 to 11 then I relived him and was on untill one. I have noticed that in your Book a good is said about the Guard allowing Booth to go by them and that they must have had Orders given them to Pass only those that had the Pass word T.B. or T.B. road. I as one of the Guards that night say that we did not have any such orders and to explain it more so you will understand it our orders were to let no one into the city after 9 oclock at night unless they gave good reason to satisfy the Guard. you must understand that there was a Guard at Both ends of Bridge. the Guard on the city end had different orders then we did but I do not know what they were. but one thing I do know is that to cross the Bridge they had to Pass that Guard and after they did Pass and came across we had no right to stop them. Our Orders were to stop going in not to stop coming out so if the Pass word was given out that night so that they could get by the Guard it must have been given to Guards at the city end of Bridge. we did not have any Pass word at all that night nor at any other night as we did not require any as coming from the City. They had to Pass Guards before Passing us. if I or my comrades on Guard at our End of Bridge had known of the murder at the time that Booth crossed, you can be assured that they would never have got through that gate. we all thought it strange to see Booth and Herold come back again over the Bridge for it was our Guard that had kept them Prisoners in Block House until Orders came to let them go. I was the man that recognized Booth while in Guard house. also that same night after the murder for I stood so close to him while the Guard, Drake, was talking with him, and as the light from Block House shown on his face I could not fail to know him. I was Only a Boy at that time just 18 years and 15 Days Old but a man grown. in my letter to Gen. Dana who was only a Lieutant at that time of the murder I have stated just as I remembered it. They did say that they were going up the T.B. or T.B. road but we did not have any Orders to use such a word that night. I enclose also letter from D[illegible] if these letters are of any use to you use them then return. if I [illegible] more Reading your Book [illegible] any more news will write.

Sincerly yours
F. A. Demond”

May 31, 1916 (51 years after the event)
It appears that correspondence continued between Finis Bates and Frederick Demond for some time. However the next letter from Demond in Bates’ archive comes almost 5 years after the last one quoted. Notice the stark differences between Demond’s 1911 letter in which he denies there having been any password, and this one after 5 years of corresponding with Mr. Bates.

Quote:“Cavendish Vt May 31st 1916
Mr Finis L. Bates

Dear Sir
Yours of the 29th at hand in reply to same I would state that I do not know who gave the instruction to the Officer Commanding Guards. the way we received Our Orders was like this. On the evening of the assa^s^nation about 8 or 9 O clocl the Sergt. of the Guard who was stationed on the Washington side of Bridge came across and told the Coporal (Sullivan) who was in command of the Squard of which I was a member to use the word T.B. Countersign T.B. Road you will understand that there is two Pass words. the Idea is that if some one should catch the first one and we were suspicious of him we would demand the countersign -. also you must remember that there was a guard at both ends of Bridge. so any one coming from Washington had to Pass Guard at the Washington End before they could cross. I expect that the Sergt. must have gotten his Orders from Leiut. D. D. Dana has he was our commanding Officer but I am not sure. One thing that I do know is that until that evening we never had Orders to use countersign T.B. or T.B. Road. the way I received the word was like this I was on Second Releif. the first Releif went on at 9 oclock and I was second Releif. that went on Duty at 11. so when Booth and Harold crossed I was in the Door was of Guard House and saw them. Drake of my Co. C. was on Duty and I helped him Open the Gate and let them through. so you see that my own account that was Published in the Boston Globe about the Pass words was before you Published your Book and there by cannot be Faked up. I have lost my Book that you sent me having lent it so many times and do not remember who I lent it to if I have it I could have sent it to you with corrections on margin but my memory is getting Poor so I cannot remember so far back if I had the Book I could have addid so corrections. if you want to send me a copy I will look it over and make corretons and return same to you. shall be glad to help you in any way. I enclose Photo of myself and Brother taken last august 1915. I am the Short man at Right side of Photo.

Hoping that these few line will help you,

I am Sincerly Yours
F. A. Demond”

June 12, 1916 (51 years after the event)
Bates received the letter quoted above and wrote back. Here is Demond’s response:

Quote:“Cavendish Vt June 12th 1916
Mr Finis L. Bates
I am sending you enclosed some Pictures of myself. one in uniform was taken at 18 years Old. the Photo was taken when about 40 years Old cannot you take the Double one and cut it in halves. Enclosed you will find my statement of the night of April 14 1865 as well as I remember it. do you want me to send the Book Back.

Sincerly Yours
F. A. Demond

[Demond’s enclosed statement follows]

Quote:About the First of April 1865 my Co. C. 3rd Hvy. Arty. Mass. Volls. was Stationed at Fort Mahan D.C. about the Second or Third day of said month I was Ordered to report to Lieut. D.D. Dana at Fort Baker for Provost Guard duty. I did so and was employed in Guarding Prisoners who was sawing wood, and also going down to Union Town looking for Soldiers without Passes. In fact doing Police duty. After a few days I was sent down to Guard the end of the Bridge coming from Washington D.C. and crossing the East Potomac River to Union Town M.D. the names of the other men on this same duty at the Union Town end of Bridge was Corporal Sullivan in charge of the Guards and Private Drake and Johnson. I cannot remember the Given names of them at this late day. at the Washington End of Bridge was a detail of men under Sergt. Scott. I do not know the names of the rest of his detail.

On the morning of the 14th of April we received Orders not to Pass anyone into Washington unless it was for life or Death. we had no Orders to stop any one coming from Washington as the Guard at that end of Bridge was Supposed to know who they Passed. Now to explain about this Bridge it was quite a long wooden one. not in very good Order. the Gate was at the Union Town End of Bridge. and was not Shut only after 9 Oclock at night then Opened at 7 Oclock in the morning. This gate shut up against a Post set in the Ground and was Built of very heavy Timber to withstand a siege. When shut it closed up against a Block House that was built to Protect the Guard in case of a Raid. on the morning of the 14th of April as Drake and myself was setting down on a log by the side of the road two men came along. they started to go by when I asked them where to were going they said only looking around. well I said you cannot go across the Bridge it is against Orders to allow any One to cross that looks to us as Suspicious Persons. I asked them for their names but they would not tell me. well if you wont we shall hold you until we get Orders to let you go as the Officer in Command here is over to the city. but I think that you, Pointing to Booth, are the Actor that I have seen your Photo of. he then said that I was right and that his companion was Herold. while talking with them a Soldier came along on Horse back. I had seen him before when he rode by one time with General Auger. he was one of his Aides, a Capt. but I do not know his name. he wanted to know what the trouble was. Booth took him aside and they talked for some time. then the Capt. says that they are alright. I spoke to drake about it and he said we do not take Orders from him, Only from Dana. well he rode off. before going he made some remark to Booth which I did not hear. About 2 or 3 O. clock a Orderley from Head Quarters came across the Bridge and gave Corporal Sullivan a Order to let the men go. we did so. we thought that was kind of funny but we had to Obey Orders. at 9 Oclock that night we shut the Gate and Drake went on Guard. he was to be releived by myself at 11. then Johnson was to receive me a 1 Oclock as Johnson was on a Pass and would not get back until midnight. Just as we were getting ready for Guard Duty Dana came and told us no to let anyone through without the Pass word T.B. Countersign T.B. Road we thought that strange for it was the first time that we ever had a Pass word to use since we were at the Bridge [illegible] about Half Past Ten Oclock I was lying down in the Block House with the door open when I heard a Horse coming across the Bridge on a Gallop Just then Drake who was on Post sang out Walk that Horse as it was against Orders to trot across as the Bridge was old a shaky. he did not stop. so Drake sang out again Dam you walk that Horse or I will Fire at you. by that time the corporal and myself sprang up and taken my Gun in my hand I stepped into the door way. just then the man rode up I saw that it was one of the men that we let go in the afternoon. Drake says where are you going he said out into the country what country he replied T.B. Drake said T.B. what he said T.B. Road he then wanted to know if there had been any one through before he came we told him no. he said he is a Dam Pretty fellows. well I cannot wait so corporal Sullivan said Demond help Open the Gate. I did so. and he Put Spurs to his Horse and rode away. in a few minutes after we heard again another Horse Trotting across the Bridge Drake made him walk his Horse. when he came up he wanted to know if a Person had gone through we told him yes. he said that he was a Pretty fellow as he Promised to meet me here. well he was asked where are you going. he said T.B. up the T.B. Road we let him through. and Drake said it is funny what is going on tonight. about ½ to one Hour we heard a great noise across the Bridge. soon a squad of mounted Soldiers came Trotting across. we then learned for the first time of the assasnation of the President to late to stop them. Oh if I Only knew of it before we Opened the gate. they never would have got by for I would have Shot them as quick as I would a mad Dog. A great deal has been said about the Guard stopping the Only Honest man when he tried to Pass. in the first Place he did not have to Countersign. and the next Place was he was at the other End of Bridge and the Guards at that End stopped him. in regards to the report of Dana that he had removed the Guards it is all wrong. we were there that night and was not releived untill the 16th when I got Orders to return to my Co. no Guards was on the Bridge after we left as the war was ended if I have omitted anything you will find it in my letter to Danna. I saw him talking with a Officer on the Bridge but I do not know who it was. at this late day it is very hard for me to Remember so far back as I am 69 years Old was 18 when this Happened on the night of 14th April 1865

Frederick A. Demond
Late Private Co. C. 3rd Hvy. Arty. Mass. Volls”

On June 16th, four days after writing this letter to Bates, Demond sent Bates a short postcard with a correction to his narrative.

Quote:“Cavendish Vt June 16th
Mr Finis L. Bates
Dear Sir

I made a mistake in the name of the Sergt of Guard in my last letter. it should have been Sergt. Cobb instead of Scott.

Yours
F. A. Demond”

Thus ends, to the extent of my knowledge, all accounts and correspondences of Frederick Demond relating his experiences at the Navy Yard bridge. I ask that you all read them all carefully and draw your own conclusions about the reliability and trustworthiness of Demond’s accounts.

I know full well that our own biases make us “see what we want to see”, but, even acknowledging that fact, I would still like to give my opinion on Mr. Demond’s reliability one last time.

I will credit Demond that I believe him when he says that he was present at the Navy Yard Bridge on the night of April 14th, 1865. I believe he was on the Maryland side of the bridge and that he possibly assisted in opening the gate so that Booth could pass over. However, I believe Demond to be unreliable on anything beyond those points.

The only accounts in which Demond supports the idea of a password or countersign come 46 and 51 years after the event supposedly took place. This alone should make us suspicious. I previously posted about the scientifically studied fallacies of human memory and how, the more time that passes, the more likely these errors are to occur.

(07-29-2015 08:13 PM)Dave Taylor Wrote:  Human memory is a frail and fluid thing. Even ignoring the assumed memory loss that comes with aging, our minds are constantly altering our memories. Studies have shown that, among many things, imagining an event having taken place can create a false memory of it actually occurring, the manner in which you are asked about an event can change the way you remember it, and the more often you recall something the more the memory changes. We need to be objective and neurologically analytical of all accounts that are dated so far from the events they describe as there has been more time for the above named "memory tricks" to have occurred. While we know that eyewitness accounts of traumatic events, like Lincoln being shot at Ford's, also produces it's own set of memory problems. Still, logically and neurologically, memories recalled from long periods of time are inherently less accurate and therefore less credible.

In addition to these universally applicable memory issues, Demond himself writes of his own personal memory problems when he states, quite frankly that, “my memory is getting Poor”. Demond, and all accounts that are taken down so long after the events they describe, need to be taken with a healthy dose of suspicion and doubt. Some authors attempt to use the defense of, “These accounts must be true because why would ______ lie? What benefit would lying be to them after so long?” Such thinking demonstrates a disregard for how the human brain and memory work. Questioning dated accounts does not equate to calling the sources liars but merely acknowledges the well-established fallibility of memory.

The drastic changes in Demond’s accounts pre and post Bates is also a telling sign of his reliability. Prior to his lengthy correspondence with Bates and his ownership of Bates’ book, Demond flat out denies there was ever any password or countersign. However, five years later this changes. Not only does Demond then support the idea of a password and countersign, but he recounts the minute details of how he came to learn the password and how he witnessed it being used. We should be circumspect of any source that does a complete 180 degree shift on a topic, regardless of what the topic is. Coupled with the fact that Finis Bates was a known manipulator with an established agenda, it looks very likely that Demond was subtlety coaxed by Bates until his own memory was in line with Bates’ theory.

At the very least, it seems likely that Demond used some sort of resource to help his memory when writing out his June 12, 1916 statement for Bates. In this statement, which coincidentally supports Bates’ version of events entirely, Demond quotes his 1897 account almost word for word:

Quote:1897 account
“If we had only known it sooner neither one of them would have passed us, as I would have shot them as quickly as I would a mad dog”
1916 account
“Oh if I Only knew of it before we Opened the gate. they never would have got by for I would have Shot them as quick as I would a mad Dog.”

It should be noted that Bates had published Demond’s 1897 account in his book and so Demond could very well have been writing his statement while consulting Bates’ book to help him fill in the holes. Demond seems to imply that he has already done this in his May 31st letter when he recounts having lent Bates’ book to someone he could no longer remember. “I have lost my Book that you sent me having lent it so many times and do not remember who I lent it to if I have it I could have sent it to you with corrections on margin but my memory is getting Poor so I cannot remember so far back if I had the Book I could have addid so corrections.” Essentially Demond is writing that without the book in front of him to jog (i.e. alter) his memory he can’t be of more use to Bates.

Another piece of evidence that Demond used Bates’ book to help him write his final statement is this reference.

Quote:Bates’ Book
“…the incident mentioned by Secretary John Hay in his public utterance when referring to the passing of Booth and Herold over the bridge and the pursuit of the owner of the horse ridden by Herold, when he says, ‘Booth and Herold were permitted to pass and the only honest man who sought to pass was stopped.’”
Demond’s June 12, 1916 Statement
“A great deal has been said about the Guard stopping the Only Honest man when he tried to Pass.”

There, are of course, many times where Demond’s 1916 statement agrees 100% with Bates’ narrative even so much as Demond completely validating Bates’ accusation of treachery by David Dana.

Quote:Bates’ Book
“Gen. Dana, himself, confesses that he went to the East Potomac bridge and gave his orders in person. And, again, I ask, What were those orders? History does not record. He does not say. The only answer is the act of the guard. Let the world interpret what those orders were.”
Demond’s June 12, 1916 Statement
“Just as we were getting ready for Guard Duty Dana came and told us no to let anyone through without the Pass word T.B. Countersign T.B. Road…”

All of this, I remind you comes from a man who, five years earlier said to Bates,

Quote:“I have noticed that in your Book a good is said about the Guard allowing Booth to go by them and that they must have had Orders given them to Pass only those that had the Pass word T.B. or T.B. road. I as one of the Guards that night say that we did not have any such orders…”

In a previous post I attributed Demond’s accounts as “the lowest form of evidence”. I still believe this to be partly true. The lowest form of evidence would be willful perjury, which I do not believe Demond committed. Therefore, to rephrase, I believe Demond’s accounts are of the lower forms of evidence. Demond’s accounts cannot be deemed reliable due to:
- The extensive period of time between the event and source’s description of the event
- The self-confessed “poor” memory of the source
- The complete change of memory and stance of a core part of the source’s story (i.e. the existence of a password)
- The lengthy involvement of Finis Bates in procuring a supporting statement from the source

[Gene C]

Thanks for sharing that. I have a bit of a hard time trying to keep all these people and their stories straight.
It seems like quite a few of them had difficulty over the years keeping their stories straight too.

[L Verge]

Gene, I think that is a very astute observation. One thing that has bothered me with the claim that Booth (and Herold) had been detained while trying to enter the city in the morning is that no record of this has shown up in the guards' reports for that day. Once the assassin's identity was known, I would think that Demond and others on the Maryland side of the bridge would have rushed to tell someone that they had detained the man/men earlier that day when he/they were attempting to come into the city.

I realize that the authorities' procedures and tactics at that time left a lot to be desired, but it would seem that even an 18-year-old would have sense enough to think such a story was relevant. Also, wouldn't the guards have been asked to make a statement regarding the day's events - or even been summoned before the military court? When you attempt to wade through the trial transcripts, you see some things dwelt upon that seem much more irrelevant than what Demond claimed happened a half-century later.

---

Forgot to add that the letter to his brother, written within a week of the assassination, mentions that Booth is the one who told them the President had been murdered as he rode past them into Maryland. Did he ever report that to the authorities? Especially if he recognized Booth from that morning's detainment.

[Jim Garrett]

Over the years, William Wither's story of his backstage encounter with JWB became more dramatic. While Wither's coat was slashed by Booth, he initially seemed to not have suffered bodily injury. In later years, he was almost left crippled by his wounds. Likewise, many bystanders of historical events plugged themselves a little more into witnessed events, becoming minor participants. was comedian Jon Lovitz an understudy of Frederick Demond? That's the ticket!

[John Fazio]

Dave:

Here's a little wisdom from a bright fellow who, regrettably, did not live very long:

In all unimportant matters, style, not sincerity, is the essential. In all important matters, style, not sincerity, is the essential.

Oscar Wilde

My ungracious response was occasioned by your ungracious response to a gracious one.

As for the merits, I grant that there are troubling inconsistencies in Demond's accounts. But observe that in all four scenarios, there is one constant. The four scenarios are: 1) Demond says nothing about receiving an order re a password and countersign; 2) He says they had no order re a password, etc.; 3) He says they did have an order and it came from Cobb; and 4) He says they did have an order and it came from Dana. The one constant in all four scenarios is that something is said about T.B. and T.B. Road. I conclude, therefore, that something was indeed said about T.B. and T.B. Road that night by at least Booth and most probably Herold too. The circumstances surrounding the use of the terms cannot be known with certainty, because we have only Demond's accounts and they are inconsistent. But the use of the terms in some context must be regarded, from the evidence, as a near certainty.

In my opinion, the inconsistencies most likely arise from the fact that the accounts are given so long after the facts rather than from a desire to please Finis Bates. As a good example of this, consider the completely ridiculous statement that Booth and Herold crossed at the same time and announced, as they were crossing, that the President had been shot. On the other hand, there are many telltale signs in the accounts of an honest effort being made by Demond to recall the truth, such as his statement that the Maryland detail thought it strange to receive the order, because they had never previously received an order re passwords, much less this particular password, because the Maryland side guards had nothing to say about passage once the rider had been cleared on the Washington side, and such as his statement that one of the detail (Drake?) remarked, after passage of the fugitives, "It is strange what is going on tonight". There are still other signs, such as his expressions of uncertainty and failure of memory and such as his categorical denial of Dana's statement that he had ordered the removal of all the guards from the bridge before the assassination and their relocation to his headquarters at Ft. Baker.

Further, I maintain (and so state in the book; see Chapter 24) that the fugitives would not have approached the bridge unless they were absolutely certain of passage. They would not, because they could not, leave the matter of passage, even in the slightest degree, to chance. Accordingly, I accept the password thesis if for no reason other than the fact that nothing would have guaranteed passage with greater certainty than the requirement of a password and countersign and the knowledge and use of the same by the passing riders. This is circumstantial evidence of a very powerful kind, which, coupled with Demond's constant, leads me to my conclusion.

I will add, in closing, that because of Demond's inconsistencies, and also because his account of the apprehension, detention and release of Booth and Herold is difficult (though not impossible) to square with other accounts we have of their movements on the 14th, the matter of their passage is one about which reasonable minds can differ. It should therefore not be an occasion for acrimony and recrimination. For that reason, I offer you a truce.

John

[J. Beckert]

While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

[Rick Smith]

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

Well said, and I believe an accurate view of Booth's mindset: nothing was going to stop him completing his mission, short of death.

[John Fazio]

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

J. Beckert:

To begin with, gaining entrance to the box was not as uncertain as you suggest. In fact, if one accepts the theories of some assassination historians, such as Eisenschiml and Mills, it wasn't uncertain at all, because part of the conspiracy was Parker's absence from the passageway. I don't go that far, but I do believe Booth was quite certain he could gain access using a forged authorization from Lincoln, couple with a dry run to assess the difficulty.

Second, how do you suppose he would have crossed without the certainty given by a password? What if Cobb had strictly enforced General Order No. 5, which prohibited passage after 9:00 without a countersign and a pass? Kauffman believes he was duty-bound to do so. What would Booth have done? Would he have shot Cobb? Then he would have had to shoot the rest of the detail, which, of course, would have raised an alarm on the Maryland side, which would have prohibited his crossing there. Would he have relied on luck? Good looks? A gratuity? Confederates in the wings prepared to force passage? All these measures have weaknesses; none offers certainty. He needed certainty and the idea hit upon by his handlers and superiors was most likely the password idea, because nothing else would offer the same assurance of passage.

John

---

[i]

(08-07-2015 08:02 AM)Rick Smith Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

Well said, and I believe an accurate view of Booth's mindset: nothing was going to stop him completing his mission, short of death.

Rick:

A lot of things could easily have stopped him. See pp. 160-164 of "Decapitating". Let's just take one: Rathbone might have had a better grip on his jacket and kept him from going over the balustrade. Here's another: he might have broken his tibia instead of his fibula, in which case he would not have been able to walk.

John

[Rick Smith]

(08-07-2015 10:31 AM)John Fazio Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

J. Beckert:

To begin with, gaining entrance to the box was not as uncertain as you suggest. In fact, if one accepts the theories of some assassination historians, such as Eisenschiml and Mills, it wasn't uncertain at all, because part of the conspiracy was Parker's absence from the passageway. I don't go that far, but I do believe Booth was quite certain he could gain access using a forged authorization from Lincoln, couple with a dry run to assess the difficulty.

Second, how do you suppose he would have crossed without the certainty given by a password? What if Cobb had strictly enforced General Order No. 5, which prohibited passage after 9:00 without a countersign and a pass? Kauffman believes he was duty-bound to do so. What would Booth have done? Would he have shot Cobb? Then he would have had to shoot the rest of the detail, which, of course, would have raised an alarm on the Maryland side, which would have prohibited his crossing there. Would he have relied on luck? Good looks? A gratuity? Confederates in the wings prepared to force passage? All these measures have weaknesses; none offers certainty. He needed certainty and the idea hit upon by his handlers and superiors was most likely the password idea, because nothing else would offer the same assurance of passage.

John

---

[i]

(08-07-2015 08:02 AM)Rick Smith Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

Well said, and I believe an accurate view of Booth's mindset: nothing was going to stop him completing his mission, short of death.

Rick:

A lot of things could easily have stopped him. See pp. 160-164 of "Decapitating". Let's just take one: Rathbone might have had a better grip on his jacket and kept him from going over the balustrade. Here's another: he might have broken his tibia instead of his fibula, in which case he would not have been able to walk.

John

John,

But Rathbone did not have a better grip on Booth's coat and he did not break his fibula and he was able to move on.

Rick

[Rick Smith]

(08-07-2015 10:55 AM)Rick Smith Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 10:31 AM)John Fazio Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

J. Beckert:

To begin with, gaining entrance to the box was not as uncertain as you suggest. In fact, if one accepts the theories of some assassination historians, such as Eisenschiml and Mills, it wasn't uncertain at all, because part of the conspiracy was Parker's absence from the passageway. I don't go that far, but I do believe Booth was quite certain he could gain access using a forged authorization from Lincoln, couple with a dry run to assess the difficulty.

Second, how do you suppose he would have crossed without the certainty given by a password? What if Cobb had strictly enforced General Order No. 5, which prohibited passage after 9:00 without a countersign and a pass? Kauffman believes he was duty-bound to do so. What would Booth have done? Would he have shot Cobb? Then he would have had to shoot the rest of the detail, which, of course, would have raised an alarm on the Maryland side, which would have prohibited his crossing there. Would he have relied on luck? Good looks? A gratuity? Confederates in the wings prepared to force passage? All these measures have weaknesses; none offers certainty. He needed certainty and the idea hit upon by his handlers and superiors was most likely the password idea, because nothing else would offer the same assurance of passage.

John

---

[i]

(08-07-2015 08:02 AM)Rick Smith Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

Well said, and I believe an accurate view of Booth's mindset: nothing was going to stop him completing his mission, short of death.

Rick:

A lot of things could easily have stopped him. See pp. 160-164 of "Decapitating". Let's just take one: Rathbone might have had a better grip on his jacket and kept him from going over the balustrade. Here's another: he might have broken his tibia instead of his fibula, in which case he would not have been able to walk.

John

John,

But Rathbone did not have a better grip on Booth's coat and he did not break his fibula and he was able to move on.

Rick

Sorry; should have read, "Did not break his tibia. . ."

[John Fazio]

(08-07-2015 10:55 AM)Rick Smith Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 10:31 AM)John Fazio Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

J. Beckert:

To begin with, gaining entrance to the box was not as uncertain as you suggest. In fact, if one accepts the theories of some assassination historians, such as Eisenschiml and Mills, it wasn't uncertain at all, because part of the conspiracy was Parker's absence from the passageway. I don't go that far, but I do believe Booth was quite certain he could gain access using a forged authorization from Lincoln, couple with a dry run to assess the difficulty.

Second, how do you suppose he would have crossed without the certainty given by a password? What if Cobb had strictly enforced General Order No. 5, which prohibited passage after 9:00 without a countersign and a pass? Kauffman believes he was duty-bound to do so. What would Booth have done? Would he have shot Cobb? Then he would have had to shoot the rest of the detail, which, of course, would have raised an alarm on the Maryland side, which would have prohibited his crossing there. Would he have relied on luck? Good looks? A gratuity? Confederates in the wings prepared to force passage? All these measures have weaknesses; none offers certainty. He needed certainty and the idea hit upon by his handlers and superiors was most likely the password idea, because nothing else would offer the same assurance of passage.

John

---

[i]

(08-07-2015 08:02 AM)Rick Smith Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

Well said, and I believe an accurate view of Booth's mindset: nothing was going to stop him completing his mission, short of death.

Rick:

A lot of things could easily have stopped him. See pp. 160-164 of "Decapitating". Let's just take one: Rathbone might have had a better grip on his jacket and kept him from going over the balustrade. Here's another: he might have broken his tibia instead of his fibula, in which case he would not have been able to walk.

John

John,

But Rathbone did not have a better grip on Booth's coat and he did not break his fibula and he was able to move on.

Rick

Rick:


Your saying that "nothing was going to stop him" means that success or failure was purely a matter of his volition. I am saying that that is not true; that factors independent of his volition could easily have thwarted his purpose irrespective of how carefully he had planned the deed. The fact that Rathbone's grip was not strong enough and the fact that Booth did not break his tibia thus become immaterial. See pages 160-164 of my book for a discussion of all the things that could have gone wrong for Booth, thereby wrecking his purpose, regardless of how determined he was in that purpose. To put a finer point on the matter, consider that nearly everything that could have gone wrong with the other would-be assassins did go wrong!

John

[L Verge]

Booth's mission was complete the moment the bullet entered Lincoln's brain. All the points we're making, except what Parker's presence might have meant, would have occurred after the fact. I also doubt that Parker would have stopped Booth from entering the box.

I truly do not think Booth cared at that point if he lived or died. He had done what he set out to do - even though two cohorts did not (but Powell came close). Whether you consider him insane or patriotic, I consider him a political zealot willing to die for the cause.

[BettyO]

Quote:Whether you consider him insane or patriotic, I consider him a political zealot willing to die for the cause.

I agree, Laurie - and Powell was the same from what I can gather. Young, yes - very young; but also a political zealot who could die for his Cause.....

[RJNorton]

(08-07-2015 12:30 PM)John Fazio Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 10:55 AM)Rick Smith Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 10:31 AM)John Fazio Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

J. Beckert:

To begin with, gaining entrance to the box was not as uncertain as you suggest. In fact, if one accepts the theories of some assassination historians, such as Eisenschiml and Mills, it wasn't uncertain at all, because part of the conspiracy was Parker's absence from the passageway. I don't go that far, but I do believe Booth was quite certain he could gain access using a forged authorization from Lincoln, couple with a dry run to assess the difficulty.

Second, how do you suppose he would have crossed without the certainty given by a password? What if Cobb had strictly enforced General Order No. 5, which prohibited passage after 9:00 without a countersign and a pass? Kauffman believes he was duty-bound to do so. What would Booth have done? Would he have shot Cobb? Then he would have had to shoot the rest of the detail, which, of course, would have raised an alarm on the Maryland side, which would have prohibited his crossing there. Would he have relied on luck? Good looks? A gratuity? Confederates in the wings prepared to force passage? All these measures have weaknesses; none offers certainty. He needed certainty and the idea hit upon by his handlers and superiors was most likely the password idea, because nothing else would offer the same assurance of passage.

John

---

[i]

(08-07-2015 08:02 AM)Rick Smith Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 07:43 AM)J. Beckert Wrote:  While Demond's account is new to me, I take exception to the fact that Booth wouldn't have crossed unless he was certain of passage. Nothing was more uncertain to him than gaining entrance to the box at Ford's and he'd just stabbed a man that tried to interfere with his mission. I don't see him avoiding the bridge because of a password.

Well said, and I believe an accurate view of Booth's mindset: nothing was going to stop him completing his mission, short of death.

Rick:

A lot of things could easily have stopped him. See pp. 160-164 of "Decapitating". Let's just take one: Rathbone might have had a better grip on his jacket and kept him from going over the balustrade. Here's another: he might have broken his tibia instead of his fibula, in which case he would not have been able to walk.

John

John,

But Rathbone did not have a better grip on Booth's coat and he did not break his fibula and he was able to move on.

Rick

Rick:


Your saying that "nothing was going to stop him" means that success or failure was purely a matter of his volition. I am saying that that is not true; that factors independent of his volition could easily have thwarted his purpose irrespective of how carefully he had planned the deed. The fact that Rathbone's grip was not strong enough and the fact that Booth did not break his tibia thus become immaterial. See pages 160-164 of my book for a discussion of all the things that could have gone wrong for Booth, thereby wrecking his purpose, regardless of how determined he was in that purpose. To put a finer point on the matter, consider that nearly everything that could have gone wrong with the other would-be assassins did go wrong!

John

In his Robert Lincoln bio Jason Emerson writes:

"One of Robert's later friends suggested that perhaps the greatest effect of the assassination on Robert was the overwhelming guilt it caused him, in that he never forgave himself for his absence at Ford's Theatre that night. As the youngest member of the presidential party, Robert would have sat at the back of the box, closest to the door. According to Butler, Robert always felt that had he been there, "Booth would have had to deal with him before he could have shot the president."

Does anyone think Robert's presence could possibly have made a difference?

[John Fazio]

(08-07-2015 12:57 PM)L Verge Wrote:  Booth's mission was complete the moment the bullet entered Lincoln's brain. All the points we're making, except what Parker's presence might have meant, would have occurred after the fact. I also doubt that Parker would have stopped Booth from entering the box.

I truly do not think Booth cared at that point if he lived or died. He had done what he set out to do - even though two cohorts did not (but Powell came close). Whether you consider him insane or patriotic, I consider him a political zealot willing to die for the cause.

Laurie:

I agree about Parker. Had he been sitting in the chair provided for him in the passageway, Booth would have used the same writing to get past him (which I believe was a forged authorization) that he used to get past Forbes. If it worked for Forbes, it is almost a sure thing that it would have worked for parker.

John