"Lincoln's Surveillance State" Op-Ed NYTimes July 6, 2013

[David Lockmiller]

(08-06-2013 09:44 PM)Anita Wrote:  Thanks to this discussion, I have spent the last two days educating myself on the many issues related to the history and role of the telegraph in the civil war. It's a interesting and complex subject to which I never gave much thought. Oh how ill-prepared we were to fight this war.

David Lockmiller is correct. The Op-Ed piece is misleading and irresponsible but what if they don't print a retraction?

Liz's Rosenthal's suggestion of an essay correcting the record is a great educational opportunity. I hope someone does it.

If the NY Times does not print a retraction, then all of the NY Times subscribers who read the Op-Ed "Lincoln's Surveillance State" will not know that the NY Times was wrong in its statement of "truth."

I also thought that you might be interested in the following history:

The words of the original letter from Stanton as published in the “Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,” Volume 5 appears in the annotation immediately below:

To Edwin M. Stanton [1]
[January 24, 1862]

The Secretary of War has my authority to exercise his discretion in the matter within mentioned. A. LINCOLN.

Annotation
[1] NH, VII, 88-89. Lincoln's endorsement is on a letter from Stanton, January 24, 1862, reading as follows: ``In my opinion the success of military operations and the safety of the country require some changes to be made in the Bureau of Ordnance, and perhaps some others, in order to secure more vigor and activity; and I desire to have your sanction for making them.''

In his NY Times Op-Ed, Professor Mindich was able to quote all of the exact words used by President Lincoln to grant his authorization of actions to be taken by the Secretary of War, but he did not quote any of the words used by the Secretary of War describing the actions which the Secretary intended to take.

Lincoln’s authorization was written by Lincoln on the back of Stanton’s letter; the only thing that Professor Mindich needed to do was to turn the letter over to obtain those words for his Op-Ed publication.

As it turns out, the immediate problem being addressed by President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton was with the Bureau of Ordnance specifically, and the problem was not the control of any telegraph lines, but rather mortars that were supposed to have been delivered to General Grant in support of his military movement up the Tennessee River.

In the form of proof to this statement, later, that same day (January 24, 1862), President Lincoln wrote the following letter to Secretary Stanton:

“My dear Sir: On reflection, I think you better make a peremptory order on the ordnance officer at Pittsburg to ship the ten mortars and two beds to Cairo instantly, and all others as fast as finished, till ordered to stop, reporting each shipment to the department here. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.”

On the previous day (January 23, 1862), President Lincoln had written the following telegraph message to Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote which was sent by Henry A. Wise of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance:

“The President wishes the rafts with their 13 inch mortars and all appointments to be ready for use at the earliest possible moment. What can we do here to advance this? What is lacking? What is being done, so far as you know? Telegraph us every day, showing the progress, or lack of progress in this matter.” [Source: “Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Roy P. Basler, editor, Rutgers University Press, 1953, Volume 5, page 108.]

Professor Michael Burlingame (“Abraham Lincoln: A Life,” Volume II, pages 291-92) wrote of the importance of this military campaign by Grant, and specifically references the mortars problem with the Bureau of Ordnance:

“On February 6, U. S. Grant, with the help of gunboats under the command of Navy Captain Andrew Hull Foote, took Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, a victory that Lincoln considered extremely important. And, on February 16, 1862, Grant captured a Rebel army at Fort Donelson on the Cumberland . . . . This successful joint operation represented the first major Northern victory in the war; it not only opened the South to invasion along two rivers but also forced the rebels to forsake their positions in Kentucky and much of Tennessee. . . . Despite his [Lincoln’s] best endeavors, however, the mortar flotilla was not ready in time for Foote and Grant’s campaign.”

In essence, Professor Mindich has argued in his Op-Ed that President Lincoln granted his newly appointed (two weeks earlier) Secretary of War to do anything he wanted to do, including the creation of "Lincoln's Surveillance State." If anyone thinks that this is probable, then they should read President Lincoln's response letter dated April 1, 1861 to Secretary of State Seward's paper to Lincoln the same day: "When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress, I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have advice of all the Cabinet."