Lincoln's loss in 1864

[Rob Wick]

I came across the letter that in 1864 Lincoln had his cabinet sign sight unseen concerning what would happen if he lost the election of 1864. To refresh your memory, here it is:

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so cooperate with the Government President elect, as to save the Union between the Election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards.

So let's pretend. It's 1864 and the Siege of Atlanta is dragging into its fourth month. Casualties are mounting and the Confederacy shows no signs of capitulating. Finally, in late September, the siege is broken, but at a high cost of human lives. Although it was close, Lincoln loses to George B. McClellan, thanks, in large part, to the soldiers who are growing tired of the battle.

So what could Lincoln have done from November to March that would allowed him to save the Union? Is he being almost nihilistic here, in that Congress would be focusing on how to either work with McClellan or stymie his policies and not really paying attention to Lincoln (in my opinion, anyway)? Would the military have fought any harder for a lame-duck Lincoln while waiting for the man who built the Army of the Potomac to take it over again?

I realize much, if not all, of this requires speculation. However, I think it's an interesting subject that can be answered, if only somewhat. I will wait for other people to chime in before giving my own opinion.

Best
Rob

[Steve]

(06-16-2019 10:18 PM)Rob Wick Wrote:  I came across the letter that in 1864 Lincoln had his cabinet sign sight unseen concerning what would happen if he lost the election of 1864. To refresh your memory, here it is:

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so cooperate with the Government President elect, as to save the Union between the Election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards.

So let's pretend. It's 1864 and the Siege of Atlanta is dragging into its fourth month. Casualties are mounting and the Confederacy shows no signs of capitulating. Finally, in late September, the siege is broken, but at a high cost of human lives. Although it was close, Lincoln loses to George B. McClellan, thanks, in large part, to the soldiers who are growing tired of the battle.

So what could Lincoln have done from November to March that would allowed him to save the Union? Is he being almost nihilistic here, in that Congress would be focusing on how to either work with McClellan or stymie his policies and not really paying attention to Lincoln (in my opinion, anyway)? Would the military have fought any harder for a lame-duck Lincoln while waiting for the man who built the Army of the Potomac to take it over again?

I realize much, if not all, of this requires speculation. However, I think it's an interesting subject that can be answered, if only somewhat. I will wait for other people to chime in before giving my own opinion.

Best
Rob

I still think Lincoln would've won as long as Atlanta fell by say early to mid-October, maybe. However long the delay the capture of Atlanta also delays Sherman's March to the Sea but probably doesn't stop it from happening. I'm sure Lee would still have surrendered to Grant. Though, I'm not sure what the condition of Johnston's Army would be vis-à-vis surrender by Mar. or April 1865

I think McClellan was enough of a military strategist to see the South's doom and wouldn't have pressed for a peace process until he took office. It was after all the part of his own platform which McClellan actually campaigned against. Basically he'd allow Lincoln to mortally weaken the Confederates and then take credit for winning the war. I also think it's likely that unless there was some sort of a peace conference under McClellan, Booth would also try to assassinate McClellan. If he was successful (which we can't be sure of due to the changed circumstances), George Pendleton would've become President. The thought of that kind of makes one wonder if a hypothetical Pendleton administration would've been any better than the Johnson administration. A McClellan presidency probably wouldn't have been that much different from the Johnson presidency.

The most important question is whether a weakened and ending Lincoln presidency and Republicans in Congress could push through a version of the 13th amendment abolishing slavery. My guess is that it maybe would've had 50/50 odds of passing once a Union victory was inevitable and Republicans still had control of both Houses of Congress. But I might be a little too optimistic on that point.

[LincolnMan]

Wasn’t McClellan’s platform for making peace with the Confederacy and keeping slavey in place? That would have resulted in a divided USA. In Lincoln’s thinking that situation would mean the actual end of the USA.

[David Lockmiller]

(06-16-2019 10:18 PM)Rob Wick Wrote:  I came across the letter that in 1864 Lincoln had his cabinet sign sight unseen concerning what would happen if he lost the election of 1864. To refresh your memory, here it is:

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so cooperate with the Government President elect, as to save the Union between the Election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards.

Doris Kearns Goodwin brilliantly addressed this issue in her book Team of Rivals at pages 648-53.

[Rob Wick]

Steve,

In actuality, it is the 13th amendment that I'm most interested in. I agree that McClellan wouldn't have accepted Southern separation. However, I think the whole idea of emancipation would not have happened. I also think your point about Booth assassinating McClellan is an interesting one, but I wonder if McClellan backpedaled on freeing the slaves if Booth would have been as angry. After all, it was when Lincoln suggested giving the most intelligent blacks the right to vote that Booth made his vow to kill Lincoln.

I'd be interested in other points of view before going further with my own.

Best
Rob

[Steve]

If they were actually able to pass the 13th amendment prior to a McClellan inauguration, I don't think they could've stopped emancipation. I even think McClellan would come around and support ratification. He might even think he was placed in the presidency by God because he was the "only person" who could unite the country behind ratification. He would frame his conduct his conduct during the war through those lenses as well:

https://www.raabcollection.com/american-...contraband

He of course would oppose civil rights measures or voting for former slaves, though.

A President Pendleton would've probably urged states to reject ratification but I don't think he could've prevented emancipation by that point.

[David Lockmiller]

(06-17-2019 08:04 AM)David Lockmiller Wrote:  

(06-16-2019 10:18 PM)Rob Wick Wrote:  I came across the letter that in 1864 Lincoln had his cabinet sign sight unseen concerning what would happen if he lost the election of 1864. To refresh your memory, here it is:

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so cooperate with the Government President elect, as to save the Union between the Election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards.

Doris Kearns Goodwin brilliantly addressed this issue in her book Team of Rivals at pages 648-53.

In these same weeks, Colonel John Eaton recalled, Lincoln "was considering every possible means by which the Negro could be secured in his freedom." He knew that Eaton had come into contact with thousands of slaves who had escaped as the Union troops advanced. Tens of thousands more remained in the South. Lincoln asked Eaton if he thought Frederick Douglass "could be induced to come to see him" and discuss how these slaves could be brought into freedom. Eaton was aware that Douglass had recently criticized the president vehemently, denouncing the administration's insufficient retaliatory measures against the Confederacy for its blatant refusal to treat captured black soldiers as prisoners of war. He also knew, however, that Douglass respected Lincoln and was certain that he would lend his hand.

Douglass met with the president on August 19. In an open conversation that Douglass later recounted, Lincoln candidly acknowledged his fear that the "mad cry" for peace might bring a premature end to the war, "which would leave still in slavery all who had not come within our lines." He had thought the publication of his Emancipation Proclamation would stimulate an exodus from the South, but, he lamented, "the slaves are not coming so rapidly and so numerously to us as I had hoped." Douglass suggested that "the slaveholders knew how to keep such things from their slaves, and probably very few knew of his proclamation." Hearing this, Lincoln proposed that the federal government might underwrite an organized "band of scouts, composed of colored men, whose business should be somewhat after the original plan of John Brown, to go into the rebel states, beyond the lines of our Armies, and carry the news of emancipation, and urge the slaves to come within our boundaries." Douglass promised to confer with leaders in the black community on the possibility of such a plan.

(Source: Team of Rivals at pages 648-49.)

What would have happened had hundreds of thousands of slaves come within the Union boundaries as a result of the fruition of this plan proposed by President Lincoln? The South may well have been forced to capitulate in a matter of months, or even weeks, as a result of these lost labor resources.

As Lincoln wrote in his blind memo signed by the members of his cabinet: "It seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards."

[L Verge]

If the South were emptied of its hundreds of thousands of slaves, would the Union forces and the general economy have been able to support their influx and settlement? The contraband villages that sprung up were certainly no vacation destination, and those in the camps were put to work providing food for the military - much like their fate had been in the South. Personally, I think the slavery to freedom issue at that time was a no-win situation that we continue to feel the aftereffects of 155 years later.

[Rob Wick]

Steve,

I'm not sure I can agree with you on emancipation. The Democratic platform of 1864 is completely silent on that. In fact, one could interpret it as being anti-emancipation. Read this:

Resolved, That the aim and object of the Democratic party is to preserve the Federal Union and the rights of the States unimpaired, and they hereby declare that they consider that the administrative usurpation of extraordinary and dangerous powers not granted by the Constitution; the subversion of the civil by military law in States not in insurrection; the arbitrary military arrest, imprisonment, trial, and sentence of American citizens in States where civil law exists in full force; the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press; the denial of the right of asylum; the open and avowed disregard of State rights; the employment of unusual test-oaths; and the interference with and denial of the right of the people to bear arms in their defense is calculated to prevent a restoration of the Union and the perpetuation of a Government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed.

Now admittedly, McClellan wouldn't have been the first president to bypass his party's platform, but from my reading I don't think he was any friend of African-Americans. Also, it took a year for the 13th amendment to be ratified. Much of it was through the force of Lincoln and then the appeal to his martyrdom. At any point during a McClellan administration, the process could have been stopped. Look at the Equal Rights Amendment. It was on its way to passage in 1972 and 40 years later it still hasn't done so.

He of course would oppose civil rights measures or voting for former slaves, though.

Absolutely agreed on that point.

Best
Rob

[David Lockmiller]

(06-18-2019 09:03 AM)L Verge Wrote:  If the South were emptied of its hundreds of thousands of slaves, would the Union forces and the general economy have been able to support their influx and settlement? The contraband villages that sprung up were certainly no vacation destination, and those in the camps were put to work providing food for the military - much like their fate had been in the South. Personally, I think the slavery to freedom issue at that time was a no-win situation that we continue to feel the aftereffects of 155 years later.

The same night as his discussion with Douglass, Lincoln met with Governor Randall of Connecticut and Joseph Mills. Lincoln pointed out that there were "between 1 & 200 thousand black men now in the service of the Union." If the promise of freedom were rescinded, these men would rightly give up their arms. "Abandon all the posts now possessed by black men, surrender all these advantages to the enemy, & we would be compelled to abandon the war in 3 weeks." (Source: Team of Rivals at page 651.)

If Lincoln was correct in this assessment, consider what would be the immediate impact upon the South's domestic and military infrastructures by the loss of hundreds of thousands of black slaves in a short period of time. Douglass promised to confer with leaders in the black community on the possibility of such a plan. (Source: Lincoln Papers, August 29, 1864.)

Doris Kearns Goodwin wrote: "In the third week of August, Lincoln asked all cabinet members to sign -- without having read - a memorandum committing the administration to devote all its powers and energies to help bring the war to a successful conclusion. The presumption was that no Democrat would be able to resist the immense pressure for an immediate compromise peace. Slavery would thus be allowed to remain in the South, and even independence might be sanctioned." (Source: Team of Rivals at page 648.)

To repeat Lincoln's own words written in the blind memo signed by the members of the cabinet: "[I]t will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards."

[L Verge]

Speaking of free blacks - in the process of looking up something at work, I ran across these statistics that break down the number of free blacks in various sections of the country, according to the 1860 Federal Census. Please note how far behind the abolitionist stronghold of New England lagged:

New England 24,711
Mid-Atlantic 131,272
Mid-West 65,719
Upper South 183,369
Lower South 67,418
Far West 4,259

TOTAL FREE 476,748

Mention was also made in another section of this article about the poor reception that free blacks received in the North -- discrimination, job refusals, living conditions, both before, during, and after the CW. Out of the frying pan and into the fire??

[David Lockmiller]

(06-18-2019 03:55 PM)L Verge Wrote:  Speaking of free blacks - in the process of looking up something at work, I ran across these statistics that break down the number of free blacks in various sections of the country, according to the 1860 Federal Census. Please note how far behind the abolitionist stronghold of New England lagged:

New England 24,711
Mid-Atlantic 131,272
Mid-West 65,719
Upper South 183,369
Lower South 67,418
Far West 4,259

TOTAL FREE 476,748

Mention was also made in another section of this article about the poor reception that free blacks received in the North -- discrimination, job refusals, living conditions, both before, during, and after the CW. Out of the frying pan and into the fire??

Still better than having your family broken up and sold off to new owners. This is among the many disadvantages of being a slave.

Instead of referring to freed slaves by saying that they were "out of the frying pan and into the fire," I would say that free blacks were "out of the frying pan and into the world of hard knocks" with the choices of where to go and how to live limited by lesser injustices.

[David Lockmiller]

This was an absurdly difficult time for President Lincoln. But his personality and character did not waver; and, in the end, Lincoln persevered. I would again recommend to everyone to read Doris Kearns Goodwin's brilliant writing and extensive scholarship on this period of time in Team of Rivals at pages 648-53. There are more important events discussed in this time period than what I have posted here.

Through these difficult days that Nicolay deemed "a sort of political Bull Run," Lincoln was sustained most of all by his "ever present and companionable" secretary of state. Mary and Tad had once again escaped the summer heat, spending August and early September in Manchester, Vermont. Seward had hoped to get away but did not feel he should leave Lincoln in this trying period, when "one difficulty no sooner passes away than another arises." His presence buoyed Lincoln, for he never lost faith that all would be well. While Seward agreed that "the signs of discontent and faction are very numerous and very painful," he refused to panic, believing that "any considerable success would cause them all to disappear." So long as ordinary people retained their faith in the cause, a faith evidenced by new enlistments in the army, Seward remained "firm and hopeful," convinced that Lincoln would see the country through.

Even before the approaching military success in Atlanta, which would transform the public mood, Lincoln had alleviated his own discouragement by refocusing his intense commitment to the twin goals of Union and freedom. He gave voice to these ideals in late August with an emotional address to the men of an Ohio regiment returning home to their families. "I happen temporarily to occupy this big White House," he said. "I am a living witness that any one of your children may look to come here as my father's child has. It is in order that each of you may have through this free government which we have enjoyed, an open field and fair chance for your industry, enterprise and intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life, with all its desirable human aspirations. It is for this the struggle should be maintained, that we may not lose our birthright, [not only for one but for two or three years, if necessary]. The nation is worth fighting for, to secure such an inestimable jewel."

[Steve]

(06-18-2019 09:40 AM)Rob Wick Wrote:  Steve,

I'm not sure I can agree with you on emancipation. The Democratic platform of 1864 is completely silent on that. In fact, one could interpret it as being anti-emancipation. Read this:

Resolved, That the aim and object of the Democratic party is to preserve the Federal Union and the rights of the States unimpaired, and they hereby declare that they consider that the administrative usurpation of extraordinary and dangerous powers not granted by the Constitution; the subversion of the civil by military law in States not in insurrection; the arbitrary military arrest, imprisonment, trial, and sentence of American citizens in States where civil law exists in full force; the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press; the denial of the right of asylum; the open and avowed disregard of State rights; the employment of unusual test-oaths; and the interference with and denial of the right of the people to bear arms in their defense is calculated to prevent a restoration of the Union and the perpetuation of a Government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed.

Now admittedly, McClellan wouldn't have been the first president to bypass his party's platform, but from my reading I don't think he was any friend of African-Americans. Also, it took a year for the 13th amendment to be ratified. Much of it was through the force of Lincoln and then the appeal to his martyrdom. At any point during a McClellan administration, the process could have been stopped. Look at the Equal Rights Amendment. It was on its way to passage in 1972 and 40 years later it still hasn't done so.

He of course would oppose civil rights measures or voting for former slaves, though.

Absolutely agreed on that point.

Best
Rob

At the time of its ratification in Dec. 1865, the 13th amendment had the second-shortest ratification period. When Lincoln was assassinated the amendment already had 21 out of the necessary 27 states for ratification and by the start of a potential McClellan administration, 19 states would've already ratified the amendment. I don't see McClellan as being as whole-heartedly supportive of the amendment as Lincoln and Johnson were but with the Emancipation Proclamation freeing slaves in the Confederacy not under Union control in Jan. 1863, the abolition of slavery in Maryland and West Virginia, the need for the victory in the war to "mean something", etc the political momentum would've swung too strongly behind the amendment's ratification if Lincoln had been able to get it passed by Congress before a McClellan inauguration.

I can also see McClellan's ego making him convinced that the amendment's final ratifications would only be possible because God had put him in the Presidency to bring the country back together.

[David Lockmiller]

(06-18-2019 01:05 AM)David Lockmiller Wrote:  Douglass met with the president on August 19. In an open conversation that Douglass later recounted, Lincoln candidly acknowledged his fear that the "mad cry" for peace might bring a premature end to the war, "which would leave still in slavery all who had not come within our lines." He had thought the publication of his Emancipation Proclamation would stimulate an exodus from the South, but, he lamented, "the slaves are not coming so rapidly and so numerously to us as I had hoped." Douglass suggested that "the slaveholders knew how to keep such things from their slaves, and probably very few knew of his proclamation." Hearing this, Lincoln proposed that the federal government might underwrite an organized "band of scouts, composed of colored men, whose business should be somewhat after the original plan of John Brown, to go into the rebel states, beyond the lines of our Armies, and carry the news of emancipation, and urge the slaves to come within our boundaries." Douglass promised to confer with leaders in the black community on the possibility of such a plan.

(Source: Team of Rivals at pages 648-49.)

June 19, 1865, was the day that enslaved Texans got the news that President Abraham Lincoln had signed the Emancipation Proclamation. It declared the freedom of the enslaved in rebelling states — two and a half years after its signing, and a few months before the 13th Amendment abolished slavery.

(Source: NYTimes June 19, 2019.)

“The people of Texas are informed that, in accordance with a proclamation from the Executive of the United States, all slaves are free. This involves an absolute equality of personal rights and rights of property between former masters and slaves, and the connection heretofore existing between them becomes that between employer and hired labor. The freedmen are advised to remain quietly at their present homes and work for wages. They are informed that they will not be allowed to collect at military posts and that they will not be supported in idleness either there or elsewhere.” —General Orders, Number 3; Headquarters District of Texas, Galveston, June 19, 1865


But African-Americans in Houston who wanted to commemorate the occasion shortly after emancipation ran into a problem: There were few, if any, public spaces where they could gather.

So a group led by the Rev. Jack Yates, a formerly enslaved Baptist minister, pooled together $1,000 in 1872 to purchase 10 acres of land for annual Juneteenth celebrations.

Those 10 acres are called Emancipation Park. The park, which completed a $33 million renovation two years ago, is considered Houston’s oldest.

(Source: NYTimes June 19, 2019.)