Something to Ponder and Debate?

[L Verge]

I just stumbled on this question/answer on a site named Quora Digest:

Of all the Civil War battles, which one was the most decisive in turning the tide against the Confederacy? And why?

Do you agree with the sole answer?

The decisive strategy for Union victory in the US Civil War was to deny the Confederacy the capacity to maintain their resistance and defeat their leadership in the field. Ultimately the decisive battle of the US Civil War was not a single battle, but a campaign of five battles. Grant's Wilderness Campaign was remarkable in that Grant lost every battle, but by continuing his advance on Richmond, he kept his operational focus on denying Robert E Lee the freedom to maneuver that might have spared Lee a battle of attrition the Southern commander could not afford. Lee's mobility was finally eliminated when Grant crossed the James River and assaulted Petersburg, through which ran the last rail link to Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia. That link was critical. Lee could not have kept his army supplied without it. While Grant's effort to take Petersburg came up just short, Lee was forced to entrench to defend Petersburg, and he kept extending those defenses to protect the rail line, thus sacrificing all of his mobility and strategic flexibility. Thus pinned, Lee's army could be exhausted until he lost the will to fight, which happened early in the Spring of 1865.

Gettysburg is often cited as the decisive battle of the Civil War, as it marked the failure of Lee’s second invasion of the North. Lee's conduct of that battle was well beneath his usual standards, and combined haphazard and stubborn leadership. As conducted, Lee had no intention of fighting there when he accidentally became engaged. Having gotten into the fight, Lee surrendered to advantages of good defensive terrain and assumed the burden of attack almost blind for lack of proper cavalry reconnaissance. This stubborness cost him dearly. Although Gettysburg was very closely fought on the second day, Lee had already lost the advantage of good defensive terrain and faced a significantly larger Army of the Potomac on ground of its own choosing. Even before the disaster of Pickett's charge on the third day, the outcome if Gettysburg was likely to be a battle of attrition that the North could afford and the South could not.

It is possible to imagine Lee winning the second invasion of the North in 1863, but not without better control of his cavalry and a significant Union mistake. It would have taken a huge reversal of military fortune to erase the diplomatic gains that Lincoln had achieved in issuing the Emancipation Proclamation in late 1862. Lee was forced to return to his defense of Richmond, but had not lost his ability or will to fight after Gettysburg

The other viable candidate for the decisive battle of the US Civil War is Sherman's Atlanta Campaign. This view posits that the Republicans were in great trouble in the 1864 Presidential Election, which was seen then and since as a referendum on the war. This narrative suggests that the price Grant payed in Northern blood to pin down Lee was excessive and the North was ready to quit rather than finish the job of subduing the Confederacy.

Sherman fought a brilliant campaign against the inferior Confederate forces of Joe Johnston, maneuvering the Confederate general out one good defensive position after another in the rough terrain northwest of Atlanta. Jefferson Davis eventually sacked Johnston, replacing him with the pugnacious but impetuous John Bell Hood, as the Confederates were driven back to the defenses of Atlanta itself. When Sherman attacked to cut the various rail connections to the Georgia capital, Hood launched unsuccessful counter attacks. On September 1, 1864, Hood was forced to withdraw from the city to avoid losing his army to encirclement, thus shattering the illusion that the Union was stalemated in the Summer of 1864.

Actually, the preponderance of Union forces that year made it quite unlikely that the Confederates could have stymied both Grant and Sherman, and the less dramatic but devastating Union naval blockade had drastically reduced Southern access to arms or international currency. The Republicans won solidly in the election 2 months later, retaining both houses of Congress and granting Abraham Lincoln a second term, and quashing the last legitimate Southern hopes of a negotiated peace that would have preserved their independence.

While it could be argued that Jefferson Davis lost the Atlanta campaign by replacing Joe Johnston with Hood, Sherman had the forces to get the job done and out generalled Johnston before his replacement. It is quite likely that Sherman would have secured Atlanta and devastated Georgia even if he had been delayed another month or two. Even had the Lincoln administration lost the election, the South would have been in a very weak negotiating position when Lincoln's Democratic opponent, General George McClellan, was sworn in in 1865.

[Gene C]

One could argue it was the Battle of Antietam, as that gave Lincoln the victory he needed to announce the Emancipation Proclamation.
With that it kept European powers from giving direct aid and governmental recognition to the confederacy, allowed for negro soldiers, and gave an increased moral purpose as opposed to just a political purpose for the war.

[AussieMick]

I'd agree that Antietam gave the impetus for the Proclamation, but that was always going to be made sooner or later. Gettysburg caused such enormous losses to the South that it marked the end.
But I'd highlight Chancellorsville where Stonewall Jackson died as a result of wounds.
Its difficult to assess any Commanding Officer in wartime. There are always so many factors, especially 'luck', influencing the result of a battle. It seems that during some of Jackson's battles he made mistakes ... but then show me a General who was perfect (Washington? No. Grant? No. Lee? No).
There is no doubt in my mind that Jackson was a great General. Had he lived and fought at Gettysburg then I think the result would have been different ... perhaps with the war lasting 6 months or so longer than it did. Perhaps not impacting on Lincoln's re-election ... but maybe making his assassination less warranted in the minds of Booth et al. ...

[davg2000]

I realize that the question is about which battle did the most to turn the tide against the Confederacy, and my vote goes to Antietam, a “non-loss” for the Union which allowed Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. That document prevented any serious possibility of foreign recognition of the South. And following that document, blacks began to be recruited. By the end of the Civil War, nearly 200,000 had served in the Union military.

But I think the one indispensable element is Grant, who is more important than any one battle. The Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor cost the North nearly twice as many casualties as the South sustained. Yet Grant didn’t flinch. He was eventually able to cross the James River and maneuver Lee into the trenches at Petersburg. That, and the fact that Grant was willing to use the men Lee didn’t have, made all the difference.

[JMadonna]

(03-16-2019 01:25 AM)AussieMick Wrote:  I'd agree that Antietam gave the impetus for the Proclamation, but that was always going to be made sooner or later. Gettysburg caused such enormous losses to the South that it marked the end.
But I'd highlight Chancellorsville where Stonewall Jackson died as a result of wounds.
Its difficult to assess any Commanding Officer in wartime. There are always so many factors, especially 'luck', influencing the result of a battle. It seems that during some of Jackson's battles he made mistakes ... but then show me a General who was perfect (Washington? No. Grant? No. Lee? No).

At the time of Antietam the Union was on the ropes. The stunning loss at Chancellorsville, the possibility of European recognition and/or active involvement, the poor morale, the confusion of Army leadership and political sniping by the Democrats and Radicals was at it's peak. A loss would have probably have taken the State of Maryland out of the Union so the victory was a real momentum changer.

A General is only as good as his intelligence sources. It should be noted that Lee lost the two main battles he fought in Northern territory due to crucial intelligence breakdowns. It's doubtful that the 'lost order' would have found its way to McClellan had Lee not been in Northern territory, nor would Stuart have been out of touch with Lee had Gettysburg been fought in Virginia.

Taking the battle to the enemy was a 'bridge too far' for the South and led them to the path of ultimate defeat.

[L Verge]

It's interesting that my first thought at reading the question was to answer Antietam also (must be the Marylander in me) because of the preliminary results (EP, etc.), but also for the ineptitude of McClellan for failing to pursue Confederate forces to stop them from getting back "home." I think Grant would have chased them down had he been in charge. Both Grant in the field and Stanton in the War Department was the impetus needed to win after 1863.

I also agree with Michael about the effect of Chancellorsville and the loss of Jackson. I'm now waiting to hear from Wild Bill. I believe that one of his theses (either Masters' or Doctoral) was on the Battle of Gettysburg.

[L Verge]

(03-16-2019 03:17 PM)L Verge Wrote:  It's interesting that my first thought at reading the question was to answer Antietam also (must be the Marylander in me) because of the preliminary results (EP, etc.), but also for the ineptitude of McClellan for failing to pursue Confederate forces to stop them from getting back "home." I think Grant would have chased them down had he been in charge. Both Grant in the field and Stanton in the War Department was the impetus needed to win after 1863.

I also agree with Michael about the effect of Chancellorsville and the loss of Jackson. I'm now waiting to hear from Wild Bill. I believe that one of his theses (either Masters' or Doctoral) was on the Battle of Gettysburg.

I have dug a little deeper on Google and found this link rather interesting because it mentions an important Battle of Glorieta Pass in the New Mexico Territory - the far Western Theater of the Civil War. I really need Wild Bill to chime in now, because I had never heard of this battle until five minutes ago -- which is pretty normal, since the average books concentrate on the war in the East, not the West. I need to hear from the man who now lives in Arizona.

This and other links also tie the fall of Vicksburg to the companion Battle of Gettysburg as turning points, and that might tip the scales in my mind.

https://owlcation.com/humanities/Most-Im...-Civil-War

[David Lockmiller]

Battle of Gettysburg - A Short Life of ABRAHAM LINCOLN, by John Nicolay, at pages 372-76

When Meade crossed the Pennsylvania line, Lee was already far ahead, threatening Harrisburg. The Confederate invasion spread terror and loss among farms and villages, and created almost a panic in the great cities.

Under the President's call for one hundred thousand six months' militia, six of the adjoining States were sending hurried and improvised forces to the banks of the Susquehanna, under the command of General Couch. Lee, finding that stream too well guarded, turned his course directly east, which, with Meade marching to the north, brought the opposing armies into inevitable contact and collision at the town of Gettysburg.

Meade had both expected and carefully prepared to receive the attack and fight a defensive battle on the line of Pipe Creek. But when, on the afternoon of July 1, 1863, the advance detachments of each army met and engaged in a fierce conflict for the possession of the town, Meade, on learning the nature of the fight, and the situation of the ground, instantly decided to accept it, and ordering forward his whole force, made it the principal and most decisive battle-field of the whole war.

The Union troops made a violent and stubborn effort to hold the town of Gettysburg; but the early Confederate arrivals, taking position in a half-circle on the west, north, and east, drove them through and out of it. The seeming reverse proved an advantage. Half a mile to the south it enabled the Union detachments to seize and establish themselves on Cemetery Ridge and Hill. This, with several rocky elevations, and a crest of boulders making a curve to the east at the northern end, was in itself almost a natural fortress, and with the entrenchments thrown up by the expert veterans, soon became nearly impregnable.

Beyond a wide valley to the west, and parallel with it, lay Seminary Ridge, on which the Confederate army established itself with equal rapidity. Lee had also hoped to fight a defensive battle; but thus suddenly arrested in his eastward march in a hostile country, could not afford to stand still and wait.

On the morning of July 2, both commanding generals were in the field. After careful studies and consultations, Lee ordered an attack on both the extreme right and extreme left of the Union position, meeting some success in the former, but a complete repulse in the latter. That night, Meade's council of war, coinciding with his own judgment, resolved to stand and fight it out; while Lee, against the advice of Longstreet, his ablest general, with equal decision determined to risk the chance of a final and determined attack.

It was Meade who began the conflict at dawn on the morning of July 3, but only long enough to retake and hold the entrenchments on his extreme right, which he had lost the evening before; then for some hours an ominous lull and silence fell over the whole battle-field. But these were hours of stern preparation. At midday a furious cannonade began from one hundred and thirty Confederate guns on Seminary Ridge, which was answered with promptness and spirit by about seventy Union guns from the crests and among the boulders of Cemetery Ridge; and the deafening roar of artillery lasted for about an hour, at the end of which time the Union guns ceased firing and were allowed to cool, and to be made ready to meet the assault that was sure to come.

There followed a period of waiting almost painful to officers and men, in its intense expectancy; and then across the broad, undulating, and highly cultivated valley swept the long attacking line of seventeen thousand rebel infantry, the very flower of the Confederate army. But it was a hopeless charge. Thinned, almost mowed down by the grape-shot of the Union batteries and the deadly aim of the Union riflemen behind their rocks and entrenchments, the Confederate assault wavered, hesitated, struggled on, and finally melted away before the destructive fire. A few rebel battle-flags reached the crest, only, however, to fall, and their bearers and supporters to be made prisoners. The Confederate dream of taking Philadelphia and dictating peace and separation in Independence Hall was over forever.

It is doubtful whether Lee immediately realized the full measure of his defeat, or Meade the magnitude of his victory. The terrible losses of the battle of Gettysburg — over three thousand killed, fourteen thousand wounded, and five thousand captured or missing of the Union army; and twenty-six hundred killed, twelve thousand wounded, and five thousand missing of the Confederates.

It was a surprise to Meade that on the morning of July 5 the Confederate army had disappeared, retreating as rapidly as might be to the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry.

Unable immediately to cross because the Potomac was swollen by heavy rains, and Meade having followed and arrived in Lee's front on July 10, President Lincoln had the liveliest hopes that Meade would again attack and capture or destroy the Confederate army. But Meade hesitated, and his council of war objected; and on the night of July 13 Lee re-crossed the Potomac in retreat.

When he heard the news, Mr. Lincoln sat down and wrote a letter of criticism and disappointment which reflects the intensity of his feeling at the escape of Lee:

“He retreated, and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg, while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit, and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him.

I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes [especially Vicksburg], have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely.

If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect [that] you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it."

Lincoln never signed or sent the letter.

[Rsmyth]

My wife and I have visited Gettysburg numerous times. Driving down from the north, the exit before is Biglerville. Barbara once told me in the car "If Lee had pushed on another 10 miles, we would be visiting Biglerville National Park." Doesn't quite have the same ring, does it.

[Steve]

Laurie,
Here's a video on the Battle of Glorietta Pass that might be helpful:

https://youtube.com/watch?v=m1oy3u5rpU0

[L Verge]

(03-17-2019 05:21 PM)Steve Wrote:  Laurie,
Here's a video on the Battle of Glorietta Pass that might be helpful:

https://youtube.com/watch?v=m1oy3u5rpU0

Thanks, Steve - I've gotten quite a few lessons in history from this guy in the past year or so.

[Steve]

I know, right.

[RJNorton]

(03-17-2019 12:06 AM)David Lockmiller Wrote:  When he heard the news, Mr. Lincoln sat down and wrote a letter of criticism and disappointment which reflects the intensity of his feeling at the escape of Lee:

Lincoln never signed or sent the letter.

There is a paragraph on this letter in the most recent edition of the Lincoln Herald. The article is written by U.S. Army Major Adam L. Taliaferro and entitled "Lincoln & Clausewitz: An Examination of Lincoln's Military Strategy as compared to the Great Military Theorist." The paragraph reads:

"In the famous letter that Lincoln never sent to General George Meade, Lincoln admonishes General Meade for his failure to pursue and defeat General Lee, following Lee's retreat at the Battle of Gettysburg. Lincoln's cause for distress and concern was valid. Lincoln was clear and emphatic in the letter, stating if Meade would have continued to pursue Lee and closed upon him, it would have ended the war. Lincoln was correct in understanding that Lee did not 'appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape,' because Meade arguably could not conceptualize the greater strategy, and the Clausewitzian theory of center of gravity. As Clausewitz explained, "if you can vanquish all your enemies by defeating one of them, that defeat must be the main objective in the war."

The article spends a good deal of time referencing a book written by Prussian military strategist and theorist Carl von Clausewitz. The book is entitled On War. Major Taliaferro writes that "Clausewitz and On War is required instruction for U.S. military officers at the Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force Command and General Staff Colleges."

Clausewitz argues that to win a war the enemy's center of gravity must be attacked. Once the enemy's center of gravity is defeated, his ability to wage war is eliminated. In the case of the Confederacy, the center of gravity was Lee's army. (Centers of gravity can be an army, a government, allies or a leader.)

In his article Major Taliaferro is extremely praiseworthy of Lincoln's strategy and understanding of military tactics. He does not know if Lincoln read On War, but he says that Lincoln understood and believed in Clausewitzian principles, and most of his generals did not. He writes that most of the generals did not understand what the Confederacy's center of gravity was, and that Lincoln's understanding of it was the root cause of all the general-switching that Lincoln undertook.

Major Taliaferro attended the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He served combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq.

[David Lockmiller]

(03-19-2019 04:51 AM)RJNorton Wrote:  

(03-17-2019 12:06 AM)David Lockmiller Wrote:  When he heard the news, Mr. Lincoln sat down and wrote a letter of criticism and disappointment which reflects the intensity of his feeling at the escape of Lee:

Lincoln never signed or sent the letter.

There is a paragraph on this letter in the most recent edition of the Lincoln Herald. The article is written by U.S. Army Major Adam L. Taliaferro and entitled "Lincoln & Clausewitz: An Examination of Lincoln's Military Strategy as compared to the Great Military Theorist." The paragraph reads:

"In the famous letter that Lincoln never sent to General George Meade, Lincoln admonishes General Meade for his failure to pursue and defeat General Lee, following Lee's retreat at the Battle of Gettysburg. Lincoln's cause for distress and concern was valid. Lincoln was clear and emphatic in the letter, stating if Meade would have continued to pursue Lee and closed upon him, it would have ended the war. . . . As Clausewitz explained, "if you can vanquish all your enemies by defeating one of them, that defeat must be the main objective in the war."

In his article Major Taliaferro is extremely praiseworthy of Lincoln's strategy and understanding of military tactics.

Major Taliaferro attended the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He served combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Plan of Campaigns by Lieutenant-General Grant – A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln by John Nicolay (1911), pages 393 – 398.

THE army rank of lieutenant-general had, before the Civil War, been conferred only twice on American commanders; on Washington, for service in the War of Independence, and on Scott, for his conquest of Mexico. As a reward for the victories of Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, Congress passed, and the President signed in February, 1864, an act to revive that grade. Calling Grant to Washington, the President met him for the first time at a public reception at the Executive Mansion on March 8, 1864, when the famous general was received with all the manifestations of interest and enthusiasm possible in a social state ceremonial.

On the following day, at one o'clock, the general's formal investiture with his new rank and authority took place in the presence of Mr. Lincoln, the cabinet, and a few other officials:

"General Grant," said the President, "the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to do in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I 'scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

General Grant's reply:
"Mr. President, I accept this commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

In the informal conversation which followed, General Grant inquired what special service was expected of him; to which the President replied that the country wanted him to take Richmond; and being asked if he could do so, replied that he could if he had the troops, which he was assured would be furnished him.

On the following day, Grant went to the Army of the Potomac, where Meade received him with frank courtesy, generously suggesting that he was ready to yield the command to any one Grant might prefer. Grant, however, informed Meade that he desired to make no change; and, returning to Washington, started west without a moment's loss of time. [Point of observation: If Lincoln had signed and sent the letter to General Meade, it would have destroyed Meade's usefulness as a military officer. By his practical sagacity, President Lincoln spared a very useful, needed and able operations officer (not a military strategist as were Grant and Lee) for the Union army. Accordingly, Grant "informed Meade that he desired to make no change."]

Grant frankly confesses in his "Memoirs" that when he started east it was with a firm determination to accept no appointment requiring him to leave the West; but "when I got to Washington and saw the situation, it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be."

[Grant's] short visit had removed several false impressions, and future experience was to cure him of many more.

When Grant again met Sherman in the West, he outlined to that general, who had become his most intimate and trusted brother officer, the very simple and definite military policy which was to be followed during the year 1864. There were to be but two leading campaigns. Sherman, starting from Chattanooga, full master of his own movements, was to lead the combined western forces against the Confederate army under Johnston, the successor of Bragg. Grant would personally conduct the campaign in the East against Richmond, or rather against the rebel army under Lee. Meade would be left in immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, to execute the personal daily directions of Grant. The two Confederate armies were eight hundred miles apart, and should either give way, it was to be followed without halt or delay to battle or surrender, to prevent its junction with the other.

Returning promptly to Washington, Grant established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, at Culpepper, and for about a month actively pushed his military preparations.

He seems at first to have been impressed with a dread that the President might wish to influence or control his plans. But the few interviews between them removed the suspicion and all doubt on this point vanished, when, on the last day of April, Mr. Lincoln sent him the following explicit letter:

"Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plan I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster or capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you."

Grant's immediate reply confessed the groundlessness of his apprehensions:

"From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint have never expressed or implied a complaint against the administration, or the Secretary of War, for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to me my duty. Indeed, since the promotion which placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and importance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you."

The Union army under Grant, one hundred and twenty-two thousand strong, on April 30, was encamped north of the Rapidan River. The Confederate army under Lee, numbering sixty-two thousand, lay south of that stream. Nearly three years before, these opposing armies had fought their first battle of Bull Run, only a comparatively short distance north of where they now confronted each other. Campaign and battle between them had surged far to the north and to the south, but neither could as yet claim over the other any considerable gain of ground or of final advantage in the conflict. Broadly speaking, relative advance and retreat, as well as relative loss and gain of battle-fields substantially balanced each other.

Severe as had been their struggles in the past, a more arduous trial of strength was before them. Grant had two to one in numbers; Lee the advantage of a defensive campaign. He could retire toward cumulative reserves, and into prepared fortifications; knew almost by heart every road, hill, and forest of Virginia; had for his friendly scout every white inhabitant. Perhaps his greatest element of strength lay in the conscious pride of the Confederate army that through all fluctuations of success and failure, it had for three years effectually barred the way of the Army of the Potomac to Richmond. But to offset this there now menaced it what was before absent in every encounter, the grim, unflinching will of the new Union commander.

General Grant devised no plan of complicated strategy for the problem before him, but proposed to solve it by plain, hard, persistent fighting. He would endeavor to crush the army of Lee before it could reach Richmond or unite with the army of Johnston; or, failing in that, he would shut it up in that stronghold and reduce it by a siege. With this in view, he instructed Meade at the very outset: "Lee's army will be your objective point. Where Lee goes, there you will go, also."

Everything being ready, on the night of May 4, 1864, Meade threw five bridges across the Rapidan, and before the following night the whole Union army, with its trains, was across the stream moving southward by the left flank, past the right flank of the Confederates.

[David Lockmiller]

(03-17-2019 12:06 AM)David Lockmiller Wrote:  Battle of Gettysburg - A Short Life of ABRAHAM LINCOLN, by John Nicolay, at pages 372-76

The conclusion of President Abraham Lincoln's proposed letter to General Meade follows. Lincoln never signed or sent the letter.

"I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely.

If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it."

What had been the efforts made by President Lincoln to encourage General Meade to attack the retreating forces of General Lee? A concise answer to this question was written by Doris Kearns Goodwin in her book Team of Rivals at page 535:

In the wake of the triumphs at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Lincoln anticipated a quick end to the rebellion. General Meade, he told Halleck, had only to "complete his work, so gloriously prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army." In the days that followed, both Halleck and Lincoln urged Meade to go after Lee, to attack him vigorously, to capture his army before he could escape into Virginia. Robert Lincoln later said that his father had sent explicit orders to Meade "directing him to attack Lee's army with all his force immediately, and that if he was successful in the attack, he might destroy the order, but if he was unsuccessful he might preserve it for his vindication." The order has never been found. If Meade did receive it, he nonetheless failed to move against Lee. As the days passed, Lincoln began "to grow anxious and impatient." Lincoln's worst fears were realized on July 14, when he received a dispatch from Meade reporting that Lee's army had escaped his grasp by successfully crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, Maryland, into Virginia.