Gettysburg-"Turning point"of the Civil War?

[HerbS]

What gives Gettysburg the "awe" to be referred to as"The Turning Point" of the Civil War?Did Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation help that reputation? Was it because it was the "High Water Mark"of the Confederacy?Did it"Jump Start"Lincoln's popularity?Could the Confederacy have won?---Last week there was an article,that claimed that Lee had very poor military intellegence and that helped lead to his defeat!---Ideas?

[J. Beckert]

Very interesting questions, Herb. While I don't know enough about the war and individual battles to participate, what I find most interesting is the question - could the Confederacy have won? I hope Bill Richter and Jerry Madonna chime in here.

[Rob Wick]

Herb,

I think the general consensus of many historians is that Gettysburg is less important than Vicksburg, and that it's more residue of the belief of the importance of the eastern theater over the western. I think much of the reason for Gettysburg's prominence has to do with Lincoln's address along with the way the battle has been remembered throughout the years. In 2003 Thomas Desjardin wrote These Honored Dead: How the Story of Gettysburg Shaped American Memory in which he not only gives a history of how the battle was remembered, but he attempts to debunk some of the myths which have grown up around it. Add to that the dramatic interpretation it received from Ken Burns, and you've got a recipe for mythmaking that's hard to defeat.

Personally, I think Vicksburg was far more important as it cut the Confederacy in two and opened traffic on the Mississippi again.

Best
Rob

[L Verge]

This time, I'm agreeing with Rob (don't faint). What was achieved with the siege and fall of Vicksburg was much more important to the Union, in my opinion. Even if the Confederate forces had advanced into the north after Gettysburg, they surely would have been stopped a short while later at some place in Pennsylvania. Meade's failure to immediately go after the retreating Rebs didn't help either. Obtaining control of the Mississippi River had been a prime object for both sides, and the Union took the victory.

[Gene C]

I'm not so sure. This was the first major defeat for Lee, it proved he was not invincible. It did stop an offensive move on the part of the confederacy. The loss of men and resources from the battle at Gettysburg became an ever increasing problem for the south. The effect on morale for both sides changed with this battle. I think is was the turning point.

With Vicksburg, did the south loose that much with access to the west (Arkansas and Texas) cut off? Was the south going to continue to get additional manpower form these states? While it was a valuable port, the north already controlled New Orleans and Memphis. Grant had Vicksburg surrounded and controlled much of the railroads in and out of the city. If confederate goods from the west made it into Vicksburg, they couldn't go east very easily.

[Rob Wick]

Gene,

Those are all legitimate points, but I would question a couple.

First, I think Antietam was really Lee's first major defeat, especially in a strategic sense for the Confederacy. After that point Great Britain really had little interest in recognizing the Confederacy, Lincoln was able to issue the Emancipation Proclamation without it looking like a desperation move and it forced Lee to retreat back into the south without a battlefield win. After the issuance of the EP, any foreign nation that recognized the Confederacy ran the risk of appearing to condone slavery.

As for the morale effect, if you look at how Lincoln approached the election of 1864, that spoke highly about what the country felt even after Gettysburg. Lincoln was convinced he was going to be defeated by George McClellan because he knew the country was tired of the blood-letting. Only Sherman's capture of Atlanta and the massive coverage it received in the northern press turned the tide (it's more complex then that, but that's the short answer).

In a strategic sense, even after Gettysburg, it took nearly another two years for the north to subdue the Confederacy, and that only came about because of Grant's tenacity and willingness to fight to the bitter end. Many question whether or not Meade should have pursued Lee and fought it out, but for whatever reason he chose not to. I think that speaks volumes about the approach that Meade would have taken had Grant stayed in the west.

I think a reasonable case can be made that if one had to pick 1863 as a turning point, it would be 65-35 in favor of Vicksburg.

Best
Rob

[Gene C]

Good point about Antietam.

At the time many thought Lincoln would not win re-election, I'm not sure many outside of the Confederate leadership knew how desperate the situation was for the south. McClellan wasn't willing to follow the democrat platform which I believe was written by Copperhead Clement Vallandigham. I think there may have been a more prevailing attitude in the north of "we are tired of the war but we've come to far to give up now" But this is my opinion

What was the question we're supposed to answer?

[Wild Bill]

For what it is worth, my MA thesis was on the Union Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign and I have written on the First Day’s Battle and the Cavalry Battle of Kelly’s Ford that preceded the Gettysburg Campaign. My apology for being so long and voicing contrary opinions to the usual story.

No army really had good intelligence in the CW on either side. The information was meager and usually out of date. Usually the South has an advantage in that the war was fought there and locals and some soldiers knew the area. But the Yankees used slaves and freedmen in much the same way. Often both sides sent spies into the field to uncover enemy intentions, as did the scout Harrison for Longstreet in the Gettysburg Campaign (it is in the movie, gang).

Lee is usually said to have been without cavalry, Stuart and his mounted legions on a raid round the Union forces and essentially cut off from Lee because the Union army was in their way. This is only partially true. Lee had 4 brigades of cavalry with his army (Jones, Robertson, Imboden, and Jenkins) while Stuart had 3 brigades (F. Lee, Chambliss, and Hampton) with him.

Lee did not ever learn how to employ cavalry. He blew it in the Seven Days’ Campaign before Richmond when he sent Stuart off on a raid to White House Plantation instead of watching McClellan in his retreat. Lee commanded all his units, foot and horse, this way. He set out general objectives and allowed the unit commanders to figure out how to carry out his orders—much like the Germans in WW II.

Men like Stuart, Stonewall Jackson, and even Longstreet thrived on this system. But at Gettysburg, Lee’s prime maneuver element was no longer commanded by the aggressive Jackson. Now it had been broken into 2 halves, commanded by A P Hill and R S Ewell.

A tough fighter, Hill always got sick the day of battle. Ewell, a commander under Jackson, had just recovered from a leg amputation and rejoined the army. But Ewell was Jackson’s main subordinate and Jackson commanded by iron discipline. Everyone followed his orders to the tee or got court-martialed. Ewell was used to than system, so when he was told to do what was right at Gettysburg but not bring on a general battle, he hesitated and the first day’s battle was incomplete. He failed to take the last hill in front of his force, and gave the Yankees the position that would ultimately cost the battle.

The first Confederates on the field were the units that had been decimated a couple of months earlier at Chancellorsville. This meant that the fully equipped and manned Union Cavalry could hold on longer the first day, which also helped Meade, through his subordinate Hancock, hold the crucial hills South of Gettysburg.

But the Confederates won the first day’s battle, anyhow. The next day, both armies were reinforced. Mead constructed his famous fishhook position South and East of Gettysburg. Longstreet came up and maneuvered around the Union left flank. Facing him was General Dan Sickles with the Union III Corps.

Sickles knew the Rebels were going around his left. The same thing had happened at Chancellorsville and he was nearly cut off and destroyed. He refused to have it happen again. So he advanced his Corps out a half mile or so in front of his selected position to some high ground.

Sickles lost his whole Corps in the fighting as Longstreet came through the wheat field and the peach orchard and right up on top of Cemetery ridge. But Anderson’s Confederates did not commit completely and the Union line held, particularly holding on to he Round Tops. (20th Me in the Movie). This was the last battle that Lee’s army really won.

Since June 30, 1862 to July 2, 1863, the Rebels never really lost a battle. Some were close but none was truly lost. Lee and Longstreet argued what they should do next—Longstreet wanted to slide off toward Washington, DC, while Lee wanted to end the war here and now. Lee was army commander so he won out. The result was Picket’s charge right through the center of the Union line.

What most commentators leave out is the Pickett was supported by a Confederate cavalry attack that was supposed to come in behind the Union line at the same time that Pickett hit it in front. But led by George Armstrong Custer, the Yankees dealt Stuart’s men a rare and decisive defeat at Rummel’s Farm or Cress Ridge and left Pickett hanging in front of the Union position where he was cut apart.

Meade was criticized for letting Lee get away. This was unfair on Lincoln’s part and historians retell it all the time. Remember two things: A retreating army almost always out-marches a pursuing army. Both armies were completely shot to pieces. Lee moved to survive, Mead followed and hoped no big battle would ensue. Now he would have to attack and he had seem Lee wreck his whole army and Meade’s too in the last 3 days.

Could the Rebs have won Gettysburg? Yes. On any of the 3 days.

But there is another factor that often is not referred to in military history. As Napoleon once said, he would rather have a lucky general that a capable one. Lee’s luck seemed to have run out.

Another theory is that Lee suffered a heart attack before and during the battle and was not up to snuff.

One thing for sure, the Confederate cavalry’s “absence” did not defeat Lee. Stuart’s only defeat came at the hands of Custer.

Jeff Davis realized all this. When Lee handed in his resignation, Davis refused to consider it. It is like Rob Wick said, Lee was not losing the war. The commanders in the West did it, especially Joe Johnston, Braxton Bragg, and John C. Pemberton. They inflicted around 10,000 casualties against Grant’s Yankees and lost a 30,000 army to captivity in the process. Lee lost 27,000 and Meade 23,000—the difference was Pickett’s charge. But Lee lived to fight on for another year and 9 mos.

I doubt Gettysburg hurt Lincoln’s popularity. I doubt the Emancipation Proclamation had anything to do with it. Fate, destiny, God seem more important.

A final theory was voiced by Pickett himself—the Union army might have had a hand in Lee’s defeat, he opined after the war.

[Gene C]

(07-15-2013 03:53 PM)Wild Bill Wrote:  Fate, destiny, God seem more important.

Thanks Wild Bill.
A good overall analysis of the battle. I especially like that line above.

[L Verge]

Now, what's your opinion as to which victory in the first few days of July 1863 was the most important -- the fall of Vicksburg to Union forces, or winning at Gettysburg?

[Wild Bill]

Gettysburg. If the North lost it it would have had national and international repercussions. A loss at Vicksburg would have been lost in the continuing war and another campaign against the city.

[Rob Wick]

While I can't agree with Bill about which loss was more important, let me add another thought to the mix. I don't think either battle was "the turning point" in the war. A turning point is usually defined as a point in which after it happens, the outcome is generally settled. I don't think it was until Grant was actually put in charge of all Union troops in 1864 that this point was reached. Grant's continued bombarding of the Confederacy exposed the various weaknesses that other Union commanders either didn't or wouldn't see and finally ended the war.

Just another thought.

Best
Rob

[L Verge]

I'll bow to Bill because I consider him a master of the Civil War (among other things). Bringing Grant to the eastern front, however, was a very wise move. He certainly proved that you don't have to graduate at the top of your class to get the job done.

[HerbS]

The History prof from Wells College at the Seward House Presentation felt that the Pa.Terrain was too rugged for the Confederate Army.Thus,they were exhausted in battle.Too many hills and rock formations to conquer the Union forces.

[JMadonna]

(07-15-2013 04:59 PM)L Verge Wrote:  Now, what's your opinion as to which victory in the first few days of July 1863 was the most important -- the fall of Vicksburg to Union forces, or winning at Gettysburg?

Depends on which criteria you use.

Vicksburg was more important from the Union's strategic point of view. Secondly, Pemberton lost his entire army of 30,000 without firing a shot. Compare manpower losses to both sides and Vicksburg is the winner.

Militarily, the victory at Vicksburg cut the amount of territory held by the Confederates to whatever Lee and the Army of Tennessee could hold. Gettysburg re-won the State of Pennsylvania.

Psychologically, Lee was the king of the battlefield so his loss gave the propaganda organs in the east something good to write about.