Lincoln's Unconstitutional Actions

[David Lockmiller]

(01-05-2018 10:45 AM)RJNorton Wrote:  As I look back upon the nation's history I am sometimes surprised at what the Supreme Court finds constitutional.

Roger,

I agree. I provide a more recent example:

In 1976, on a five to three ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, the majority granted absolute immunity to all state and federal trial court prosecutors from 42 U.S.C. section 1983 civil lawsuits for damages brought by "wrongfully convicted" criminal defendants alleging unconstitutional suppression of exculpatory and witness-impeaching evidence.

The counter argument in support of granting only qualified immunity to government trial court prosecutors for unconstitutional suppression of evidence was written in a dissenting opinion by Justice Byron White and joined by Justice William Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall, Jr. (See Imbler at 432-47.)

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment of the Court and in much of its reasoning. I agree with the Court that the gravamen of the complaint in this case is that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony; and that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for money damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for presentation of testimony later determined to have been false, where the presentation of such testimony is alleged to have been unconstitutional solely because the prosecutor did not believe it or should not have believed it to be true. I write, however, because I believe that the Court's opinion may be read as [424 U.S. 409, 433] extending to a prosecutor an immunity broader than that to which he was entitled at common law; broader than is necessary to decide this case; and broader than is necessary to protect the judicial process. Most seriously, I disagree with any implication that absolute immunity for prosecutors extends to suits based on claims of unconstitutional suppression of evidence because I believe such a rule would threaten to injure the judicial process and to interfere with Congress' purpose in enacting 42 U.S.C. 1983, without any support in statutory language or history.

Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

As the language itself makes clear, the central purpose of 1983 is to "give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (emphasis added). The United States Constitution among other things, places substantial limitations upon state action, and the cause of action provided in 42 U.S.C. 1983 is fundamentally one for "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). It is manifest then that all state [424 U.S. 409, 434] officials as a class cannot be immune absolutely from damage suits under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that to extend absolute immunity to any group of state officials is to negate pro tanto the very remedy which it appears Congress sought to create. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974). Thus, as there is no language in 42 U.S.C. 1983 extending any immunity to any state officials, the Court has not extended absolute immunity to such officials in the absence of the most convincing showing that the immunity is necessary.

It is apparent that the injury to a defendant which can be caused by an unconstitutional suppression of exculpatory [and/or witness-impeaching] evidence is substantial, particularly if the evidence is never uncovered. It is virtually impossible to identify any injury to the judicial process resulting from a rule permitting suits for such unconstitutional [424 U.S. 409, 445] conduct, and it is very easy to identify an injury to the process resulting from a rule which does not permit such suits. Where the reason for the rule extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it would truly be "monstrous to deny recovery." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d, at 581.